The "Great Tradition" and Post Reformation Orthodoxy

[Semper Fidelis]

[Administrator]
Phil, perhaps I haven't been clear yet, so let me try once again.

I'm not engaging in debate right now, as one participant amongst many. As an administrator of the board, I am seeking to clarify whether you qualify to engage in discussion here or not. That's not a metaphysical question, and it's not really very complicated.

The Belgic confession says God is simple; the Westminster confession says God is without parts. If you think those statements are unbiblical, then we need to call a halt to this discussion. It doesn't matter how you reached that point -- Bible scholarship, metaphysics, or some other avenue. The confessions set the parameters for membership and discussion here.

You need to answer the question directly, and without imposing any conditions on your reply. Do you affirm the simplicity of God as a meaningful statement about God's nature?
[/Administrator]

@Ulster Fry - I want you to slow down. Plese. We're not trying to debate you here as much as trying to figure out how we can sort out if we confess the same faith.

I posted this in the other thread not knowing Ruben was posting this: https://puritanboard.com/threads/simplicity-of-god-in-the-church-fathers.112841/post-1353966

When someone quotes Charnock as an example, it's not intended to be a "well, he put you in your place" kind of post.

It's more like the idea that Charnock and others are trying to say something about God (that includes a Confessional understanding of simplicity).

How would you communicate that you're really confessing God in the same way as Charnock without resorting to a bunch of questions being thorwn back at them as if the whole discussion is some sort of metaphysical smackdown?

The Church is trying to confess something together so how do you sort this out? Are you simply taking issue with very rigid metaphysical definitions that came in the time of Aquinas but you're otherwise content to confess what the Church had historically confessed?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Ah, so this is threatening to kick me off the board? I see. And you don't even have to tell me what is meant by 'parts' such that I could say in what sense I agree with it? And the fact I've already given a clear statement to Jacob earlier in the thread?

I would expect this in a banana republic rather than a Christian discussion board. If this is how things will be moderated, feel free to get rid of me.

You posted this after I did. Again, slow down. Don't be a hothead.

We're not the Church but we are Church men. We're trying to figure out if we confess the same thing regarding Who God is.

 

[Ulster Fry]

@Ulster Fry - I want you to slow down. Plese. We're not trying to debate you here as much as trying to figure out how we can sort out if we confess the same faith.

I posted this in the other thread not knowing Ruben was posting this: https://puritanboard.com/threads/simplicity-of-god-in-the-church-fathers.112841/post-1353966

When someone quotes Charnock as an example, it's not intended to be a "well, he put you in your place" kind of post.

It's more like the idea that Charnock and others are trying to say something about God (that includes a Confessional understanding of simplicity).

How would you communicate that you're really confessing God in the same way as Charnock without resorting to a bunch of questions being thorwn back at them as if the whole discussion is some sort of metaphysical smackdown?

The Church is trying to confess something together so how do you sort this out? Are you simply taking issue with very rigid metaphysical definitions that came in the time of Aquinas but you're otherwise content to confess what the Church had historically confessed?

I affirm that God is the ultimate sole reality, I affirm the Creator-creature distinction, that God is the sole Creator of all things, visible and invisible, and that God freely created all things. I also believe that we can meaningfully talk about God and that this does not affect the Creator-creature distinction, because it does not commit me to any kind of univocity of being.

I have also asked time and time again if my interlocutors can confirm that the Bible itself uses language according to their own standards, and whether the Bible is committed to univocity of being for using language in such a way. Those who are biblical scholars, please tell me exactly where I can find this in the standard lexicons for those predications made of God and of creatures. I am being entirely sincere in asking this question.

I think that simplicity, at least as it is articulated by Thomas Aquinas and all his followers, contravenes God's freedom and leads to necessitarianism. I recognise that simplicity has been affirmed from very early on in the church, but that it has undergone significant development. I say this as a former card carrying Reformed Thomist, trained by Thomists, who wrote a Masters dissertation defending simplicity under a Thomist.

If the administrator threatening me with a ban had any integrity, he would define 'parts' for me clearly (or how the Westminster divines understood it) so that I can give him a clear answer to his question. I have already said that, trivially, God is metaphysically simple because I have a deflationary view of metaphysics. That doesn't make me a nominalist in the historic sense either, as confusing as that is. The administrator in question has jumped on the word 'trivial', acknowledging that it has a particular view in philosophical discourse, and now put in the qualifier 'meaningfully' in terms of whether I can affirm that God is 'without...parts'. While also not being allowed to talk about metaphysics, which is the height of irony. It comes across as vindictive, frankly. I don't think anyone being interviewed for ministry in any of the confessional Reformed denominations (in my country anyway) would face this level of scrutiny.

 

[Charles Johnson]

I affirm that God is the ultimate sole reality, I affirm the Creator-creature distinction, that God is the sole Creator of all things, visible and invisible, and that God freely created all things. I also believe that we can meaningfully talk about God and that this does not affect the Creator-creature distinction, because it does not commit me to any kind of univocity of being.

I have also asked time and time again if my interlocutors can confirm that the Bible itself uses language according to their own standards, and whether the Bible is committed to univocity of being for using language in such a way. Those who are biblical scholars, please tell me exactly where I can find this in the standard lexicons for those predications made of God and of creatures. I am being entirely sincere in asking this question.

I think that simplicity, at least as it is articulated by Thomas Aquinas and all his followers, contravenes God's freedom and leads to necessitarianism. I recognise that simplicity has been affirmed from very early on in the church, but that it has undergone significant development. I say this as a former card carrying Reformed Thomist, trained by Thomists, who wrote a Masters dissertation defending simplicity under a Thomist.

If the administrator threatening me with a ban had any integrity, he would define 'parts' for me clearly (or how the Westminster divines understood it) so that I can give him a clear answer to his question. I have already said that, trivially, God is metaphysically simple because I have a deflationary view of metaphysics. That doesn't make me a nominalist in the historic sense either, as confusing as that is. The administrator in question has jumped on the word 'trivial', acknowledging that it has a particular view in philosophical discourse, and now put in the qualifier 'meaningfully' in terms of whether I can affirm that God is 'without...parts'. While also not being allowed to talk about metaphysics, which is the height of irony. It comes across as vindictive, frankly. I don't think anyone being interviewed for ministry in any of the confessional Reformed denominations (in my country anyway) would face this level of scrutiny.

Brother, have you considered the possibility that you're getting push-back because we're all having quite a bit of trouble following what you're saying, and where your beliefs lie?
You appear to have been arguing against simplicity in most of you messages here. Even in your last one you appear to question whether it's in the Bible ("where can I find this in the standard lexicons"). But then you say you "trivially" hold to it. I for one have no idea what it means to trivially hold to something. I usually say I believe something or I don't. In my country "trivial" means "unimportant," and I don't know what it means to "unimportantly hold to divine simplicity."
Couldn't you just tell us if you think God is a composite whole, separable into his existence, essence, attributes, mind, will, accidents, etc, or if he's simple, and his essence, existence, mind, will, and attributes are all one and the same, the whole and indivisible God?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I affirm that God is the ultimate sole reality, I affirm the Creator-creature distinction, that God is the sole Creator of all things, visible and invisible, and that God freely created all things. I also believe that we can meaningfully talk about God and that this does not affect the Creator-creature distinction, because it does not commit me to any kind of univocity of being.

I have also asked time and time again if my interlocutors can confirm that the Bible itself uses language according to their own standards, and whether the Bible is committed to univocity of being for using language in such a way. Those who are biblical scholars, please tell me exactly where I can find this in the standard lexicons for those predications made of God and of creatures. I am being entirely sincere in asking this question.

I think that simplicity, at least as it is articulated by Thomas Aquinas and all his followers, contravenes God's freedom and leads to necessitarianism. I recognise that simplicity has been affirmed from very early on in the church, but that it has undergone significant development. I say this as a former card carrying Reformed Thomist, trained by Thomists, who wrote a Masters dissertation defending simplicity under a Thomist.

If the administrator threatening me with a ban had any integrity, he would define 'parts' for me clearly (or how the Westminster divines understood it) so that I can give him a clear answer to his question. I have already said that, trivially, God is metaphysically simple because I have a deflationary view of metaphysics. That doesn't make me a nominalist in the historic sense either, as confusing as that is. The administrator in question has jumped on the word 'trivial', acknowledging that it has a particular view in philosophical discourse, and now put in the qualifier 'meaningfully' in terms of whether I can affirm that God is 'without...parts'. While also not being allowed to talk about metaphysics, which is the height of irony. It comes across as vindictive, frankly. I don't think anyone being interviewed for ministry in any of the confessional Reformed denominations (in my country anyway) would face this level of scrutiny.

Well, first of all, stop charging people with a lack of integrity. You are inferring the worst possible motives. It's really hard to sort out certain things when people are arguing about something.

I can't seek for Ireland, but I've been involved in the examination process of licentiates and ordinands for many years.

When someone comes out and says that they have a problem with simplicity and then demands to know what the Confessional writers meant by it, then it's really hard to determine if someone is being obstinate.

Maybe this boils down to certain distinctions about theology being more sapeinta than sicentia in some theological discussions. It's not necessarily going to be answered by satisfying someone's metaphysical convictions.

Like it or not, we set this board up with clear Confessional boundaries. It's not a "Banana Republic" but a board that seeks to limit discussions to those who confess the Standards.

That doesn't mean that we can't investigate and debate certain fine points of theology or metaphysical assumptions, but we're not set up to have someone coming in "hot" demanding that we "prove" that someone is outside Confessional boundaries when they seem to be saying that the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity needs to be jettisoned.

Let's assume that the Divines knew what they were communicating when they confessed that God was simple. If they were examining you for ordination, how would you convince them that you're confessing the same idea? Maybe you would affirm it without the Thomistic accretions? Would you challenge them to a metaphysical duel? I know this is anachronisitc but do you understand what I'm driving at? There needs to be a way to determine if your understanding of simplicity is equivocal to what the Reformed orthodox generally understood.

 

[py3ak]

Ah, so this is threatening to kick me off the board? I see. And you don't even have to tell me what is meant by 'parts' such that I could say in what sense I agree with it? And the fact I've already given a clear statement to Jacob earlier in the thread?

I would expect this in a banana republic rather than a Christian discussion board. If this is how things will be moderated, feel free to get rid of me.

[Administrator]
Phil, I will echo Rich's plea to slow down and consider. I looked at the information you provided when you joined the Board, and I see there that you claimed Westminster best summarized Scripture, that you had a couple of scruples, and that you promised not to advocate any unconfessional or scrupled views.

If your statement to Jacob is the one mentioned in #49 of this thread (https://www.puritanboard.com/thread...ormation-orthodoxy.112819/page-2#post-1353742), that is the one that gives me hope that you may well meaningfully affirm God's simplicity. But I asked for clarification about that, focusing on your use of "trivially" and didn't initially receive that clarification. I see you've just posted while I'm typing this that God is metaphysically simple. Do you think that's what the Westminster Confession of Faith means when it says that God is without parts?

Since you think I'm being vindictive, I'll leave it to other administrators to make a determination as to whether you are within confessional boundaries or not. For my own part, I can assure you that it's not my intention to be unfair or to set up a trap for you. I am genuinely uncertain whether in your own opinion you agree with the Westminster Confession of Faith about God not having parts. If in your opinion you're unconfessional, I refer you to the terms of membership you agreed to. If in your opinion you are confessional, I remain willing to give you the benefit of the doubt.

I have conducted some theological examinations, and been present for others, and if a candidate for licensure spoke of there being minimal Biblical support for simplicity, or said he disagreed with the metaphysical framework within which such an affirmation was made, he would definitely be required to clarify before we proceeded, at least in the Classis where I serve.
[/Administrator]

 

[Ulster Fry]

Brother, have you considered the possibility that you're getting push-back because we're all having quite a bit of trouble following what you're saying, and where your beliefs lie?
You appear to have been arguing against simplicity in most of you messages here. Even in your last one you appear to question whether it's in the Bible ("where can I find this in the standard lexicons"). But then you say you "trivially" hold to it. I for one have no idea what it means to trivially hold to something. I usually say I believe something or I don't. In my country "trivial" means "unimportant," and I don't know what it means to "unimportantly hold to divine simplicity."
Couldn't you just tell us if you think God is a composite whole, separable into his existence, essence, attributes, mind, will, accidents, etc, or if he's simple, and his essence, existence, mind, will, and attributes are all one and the same, the whole and indivisible God?

I found a good example to explain what it means to say something is 'trivially true' in the philosophical literature from wikipedia. 'All phones in the room are switched off', if there are no phones in the room, is trivially/vacuously true. In the same way, given that I have a deflationary metaphysics (I don't believe there are any abstract objects/properties) then God is metaphysically simple. Given my ontology, it isn't saying a whole lot. So the requirement for me to make this 'meaningful' basically is forcing me to accept that there are abstract objects/properties, which is ridiculous.

I believe then that God is pure spirit, without body, and metaphysically simple.

But affirming your other question, again, this depends whether you are committing me to accept the existence of things such as 'essences' or 'existence' as really existing things which God has.

What I can categorically rule out, though, is that God's will, however we understand it, is identical to His existence, however we understand it, because this leads to necessitarianism or to a contradiction, via modal collapse. So you would be committing me to three options: necessitarianism, contradiction, or mystery, if I were forced to say that God's will is identical to God's existence. Does the WCF commit me to this? Do the Church Fathers teach this? Does the Bible teach this?

 

[Knight]

As an interested bystander, I believe I've been able to follow Ulster Fry's post in large measure because I have similar concerns with a Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity and I have Clarkian sympathies.

Ulster Fry rejects a realist view of universals. As such, he thinks there are no "parts" of which God even could be composed. This is why he thinks simplicity "trivially" follows from his own metaphysic and why he is asking for others to define their terms.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I have conducted some theological examinations, and been present for others, and if a candidate for licensure spoke of there being minimal Biblical support for simplicity, or said he disagreed with the metaphysical framework within which such an affirmation was made, he would definitely be required to clarify before we proceeded, at least in the Classis where I serve.
[/Administrator]

Okay, can you please provide me with said biblical support. And they are required to become Aristotelians? Really?

Where's Luther when you need him.

 

[Ulster Fry]

As an interested bystander, I believe I've been able to follow Ulster Fry's post in large measure because I have similar concerns with a Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity and I have Clarkian sympathies.

Ulster Fry rejects a realist view of universals. As such, he thinks there are no "parts" of which God even could be composed. This is why he thinks simplicity "trivially" follows from his own metaphysic and why he is asking for others to define their terms.

At this point it remains to be seen whether one is allowed to question a Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity.

 

[Charles Johnson]

I found a good example to explain what it means to say something is 'trivially true' in the philosophical literature from wikipedia. 'All phones in the room are switched off', if there are no phones in the room, is trivially/vacuously true. In the same way, given that I have a deflationary metaphysics (I don't believe there are any abstract objects/properties) then God is metaphysically simple. Given my ontology, it isn't saying a whole lot. So the requirement for me to make this 'meaningful' basically is forcing me to accept that there are abstract objects/properties, which is ridiculous.

I believe then that God is pure spirit, without body, and metaphysically simple.

But affirming your other question, again, this depends whether you are committing me to accept the existence of things such as 'essences' or 'existence' as really existing things which God has.

What I can categorically rule out, though, is that God's will, however we understand it, is identical to His existence, however we understand it, because this leads to necessitarianism or to a contradiction, via modal collapse. So you would be committing me to three options: necessitarianism, contradiction, or mystery, if I were forced to say that God's will is identical to God's existence. Does the WCF commit me to this? Do the Church Fathers teach this? Does the Bible teach this?

Hold on, you don't believe God has an essence?
How can you even hold to the Nicene Creed, or shorter catechism 6?
"Q. 6. How many persons are there in the godhead?
A. There are three persons in the Godhead; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory."

 

[Semper Fidelis]

At this point it remains to be seen whether one is allowed to question a Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity.

What remains to be seen is if you can stop being churlish when others are asking questions in good faith.

Does the issue boil down to Thomistic definitions?

When Charles quoted Church Fathers affirming essence, subsistence, and simplicity do you have a problem with historical definitions in general as metaphysically inadequate and that no language suits you or are you merely arguing against Thomistic definitions?

 

[Ulster Fry]

Hold on, you don't believe God has an essence?
How can you even hold to the Nicene Creed, or shorter catechism 6?
"Q. 6. How many persons are there in the godhead?
A. There are three persons in the Godhead; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory."

I can truly and fully affirm this without being committed to something that really exists as an abstract property called 'essence' or 'substance' which God instantiates (or has) because I don't need to read ontology off of language.

Otherwise, here's the problem based on the very thing you are trying to prevent happening. Take the set of all things which have 'essences': <God, dogs, people>

Now we really do have a problem regarding univocity of being, because God falls into the set of things which have essences, which allegedly really exist abstractly.

 

[Ulster Fry]

What remains to be seen is if you can stop being churlish when others are asking questions in good faith.

Does the issue boil down to Thomistic definitions?

When Charles quoted Church Fathers affirming essence, subsistence, and simplicity do you have a problem with historical definitions in general as metaphysically inadequate and that no language suits you or are you merely arguing against Thomistic definitions?

It boils down to whether I need to be an Aristotelian (i.e., hold to Aristotelian metaphysics) or not, to be a Bible believing, confessional Christian.

Language isn't the issue. It's reading ontology off of language (thinking that predicates commit us to the existence of properties/abstract objects).

I also don't think it has been entirely in good faith from all players in this discussion (not making this accusation against you at all).

 

[jwright82]

At this point it remains to be seen whether one is allowed to question a Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity.

Look man, I've questioned the Thomistic understanding of these things. But to my knowledge I never went outside the confessional boundaries of membership to this board. I'm not saying you are. I've focused on your philosophy of language. I'm not interested in Thomas but a meaningful philosophy of language.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Look man, I've questioned the Thomistic understanding of these things. But to my knowledge I never went outside the confessional boundaries of membership to this board. I'm not saying you are. I've focused on your philosophy of language. I'm not interested in Thomas but a meaningful philosophy of language.

Well the problem with you (I speak like this in jest) is that you can't tell me whether we are indeed capable of understanding one another or not!

And, out of interest, do you affirm that God's will is identical to God's existence?

 

[Knight]

Again, to translate contemporary philosophy into terms that might be more understandable to some on this board, when Ulster Fry says "I don't need to read ontology off of language," I believe he says this (at least in part) because he thinks language regarding universals are only "useful fictions." If universals are not real, we must qualify any suggestive language as not really corresponding to a state of affairs.

Ulster Fry can correct me if I am mistaken.

 

[jwright82]

It boils down to whether I need to be an Aristotelian (i.e., hold to Aristotelian metaphysics) or not, to be a Bible believing, confessional Christian.

Language isn't the issue. It's reading ontology off of language (thinking that predicates commit us to the existence of properties/abstract objects).

I also don't think it has been entirely in good faith from all players in this discussion (not making this accusation against you at all).

No I don't think that Aristotle and Christ is necessary to be confessional. I've argued that before but I've always, not saying you deny these, the usefulness of that language and those categories of thought for the time and place of which the creeds and confessions were written. So they are binding In my humble opinion on what a Orthodox Christian is. Again I'm interested in your philosophy of language.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

It boils down to whether I need to be an Aristotelian (i.e., hold to Aristotelian metaphysics) or not, to be a Bible believing, confessional Christian.

Language isn't the issue. It's reading ontology off of language (thinking that predicates commit us to the existence of properties/abstract objects).

I also don't think it has been entirely in good faith from all players in this discussion (not making this accusation against you at all).

My issue is that Ruben is acting in good faith as an admin. He's not asking "gotcha" questions. He, like many of us, is genuinely concerned.

Not everyone who gets concerned about a denial of divine simplicity is alarmed because they believe Aristotelian metaphysics is being violated. They're not concerned because they are all full-out Thomists.

Is it possible for you to come at this issue of Divine simplicity without denying the doctrine itself but merely certain "fully-blown" Thomistic accretions? Couldn't you simply start by saying "I affirm Divine simplicity, but I think some schools of thought (e.g. Thomism) go too far and I can't commit myself to that metaphysical school"?

What's strange here is that you aren't denying simplicity per se but then you seem to argue that the Scriptures reveal that God is simple. You demand Scriptures from people but it seems that what you're demanding is that they provide a Scripture that affirms Thomistic definitions. Most of us are just wondering why you would ask for Scriptural proof for simplicity if you believed it and you were only debating Thomism.

Do you see what iI'm driving at?

Are these things true?

1. You confess that God is simple.
2. You believe the Scriptures reveal that He is simple.
3. You can confess the Nicene Creed.
4. But, you do not agree with the Thomistic definitions of the above.

 

[jwright82]

Well the problem with you (I speak like this in jest) is that you can't tell me whether we are indeed capable of understanding one another or not!

And, out of interest, do you affirm that God's will is identical to God's existence?

In jest, I like you btw your fun to talk to, under your philosophy of language you can't understand but if add analogical use of language you can to a certain degree that any person would be able to understand. Maybe your lumping analogical into univocalism in which this whole disagreement is semantics?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Also, @Ulster Fry , do you think there are any use of words or idea in the Westminster Standards that are non-sensical to you based on your metaphysical commitments?

 

[Ulster Fry]

I've taken some examples from elsewhere to help explain my philosophy of language and ontological commitment.

'I had lunch on Monday'

'Monday is between Sunday and Tuesday'

'There's a hole in my shirt'

These are all literally true statements. Do they commit me to the real existence of something called 'Monday'? No, because 'Monday' is a social construct. Does it commit me to the existence of holes? No.

 

[Ploutos]

Again, to translate contemporary philosophy into terms that might be more understandable to some on this board, when Ulster Fry says "I don't need to read ontology off of language," I believe he says this (at least in part) because he thinks language regarding universals are only "useful fictions." If universals are not real, we must qualify any suggestive language as not really corresponding to a state of affairs.

Ulster Fry can correct me if I am mistaken.

What do you mean when you say "universals are not real"?

 

[jwright82]

My issue is that Ruben is acting in good faith as an admin. He's not asking "gotcha" questions. He, like many of us, is genuinely concerned.

Not everyone who gets concerned about a denial of divine simplicity is alarmed because they believe Aristotelian metaphysics is being violated. They're not concerned because they are all full-out Thomists.

Is it possible for you to come at this issue of Divine simplicity without denying the doctrine itself but merely certain "fully-blown" Thomistic accretions? Couldn't you simply start by saying "I affirm Divine simplicity, but I think some schools of thought (e.g. Thomism) go too far and I can't commit myself to that metaphysical school"?

What's strange here is that you aren't denying simplicity per se but then you seem to argue that the Scriptures reveal that God is simple. You demand Scriptures from people but it seems that what you're demanding is that they provide a Scripture that affirms Thomistic definitions. Most of us are just wondering why you would ask for Scriptural proof for simplicity if you believed it and you were only debating Thomism.

Do you see what iI'm driving at?

Are these things true?

1. You confess that God is simple.
2. You believe the Scriptures reveal that He is simple.
3. You can confess the Nicene Creed.
4. But, you do not agree with the Thomistic definitions of the above.

Wonderful put.

 

[Ploutos]

I've taken some examples from elsewhere to help explain my philosophy of language and ontological commitment.

'I had lunch on Monday'

'Monday is between Sunday and Tuesday'

'There's a hole in my shirt'

These are all literally true statements. Do they commit me to the real existence of something called 'Monday'? No, because 'Monday' is a social construct. Does it commit me to the existence of holes? No.

So you don't believe holes are real? What do you call them?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Everyone, can we stop debating the fine points of metaphysics so I can get @Ulster Fry to focus on what is being asked of him?

 

[Ulster Fry]

Also, @Ulster Fry , do you think there are any use of words or idea in the Westminster Standards that are non-sensical to you based on your metaphysical commitments?

Not that I can think of, no. As I've said before in other posts, I don't think the metaphysical background of the creeds and confessionals are there explicitly, but I know they motivated the language (and I'm thankful for that as it has given us helpful terminology). My metaphysical commitments are to what Scripture and the Nicene Creed commit me to (one Creator, God, who created heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible). I am reluctant to include abstract objects of any sort. I'll answer your four questions in the next post.

To answer @Knight, fictionalism is one such anti-realist view, but there are a multitude. I don't know which exactly I fall into yet, but the very fact that there are options that I can take which don't commit me to abstract objects is a blessing.

 

[jwright82]

I've taken some examples from elsewhere to help explain my philosophy of language and ontological commitment.

'I had lunch on Monday'

'Monday is between Sunday and Tuesday'

'There's a hole in my shirt'

These are all literally true statements. Do they commit me to the real existence of something called 'Monday'? No, because 'Monday' is a social construct. Does it commit me to the existence of holes? No.

Need to change that post. When I said "you don't understand" I meant that no one understands what someone means completely by a word they use. Because you're not them. Yes to your examples but even Quine took the later Wittgenstein seriously. Your philosophy of language is still undefended.

 

[jwright82]

My apologies for saying you didn't understand.

 

[SeanPatrickCornell]

So you don't believe holes are real? What do you call them?

If I am understanding things then I think the point here is that holes themselves aren't a thing that has an actual existence, per se, but rather it's kind of an abstract concept. By definition, holes (themselves) don't exist, because they are what we call a place where something is not.

In the example given, there is no "hole" in the shirt (what is a hole made out of anyway?), but there is a mathematically definable space in which no shirt material currently exists but could have existed (or previously did exist) in a non-faulty shirt.