The "Great Tradition" and Post Reformation Orthodoxy

[Semper Fidelis]

My point was that their method was sometimes eclectic, as Muller points out in volume 1. They would have all agreed with Thomas, for example, that God is Pure Act. On the other hand, they would have used Scotist categories to employ the archetypal/ectypal distinction. If you are talking about the Theopolis link, none of those writers, except perhaps Lenow, are actually Reformed so I wouldn't have expected all of them to hold to the a/e distinction.

My post wasn't intended to require them to hold to it, but to point out how the underlying assumptions about the place of philosophy or man's theological limits are often the reason for the polemical disagreements. It's these very commitments about the priority of Scripture or the limits of analogical knowledge that seem to drive the eclectic appropriation and modification of Thomism or Nominalism.

You can see some of the disagreements on this thread where the cards are not completely on the table as far as the place given to human reason or methods like analytical philosophy to evaluate whether or not a doctrine is still viable.

It's not just the Biblicists that may be confused, but the metaphysicians don't seem to be aware as to why charges such as "appeals to mystery" might be met with a "...so what, that's the nature of ectypal theology...."

 

[RamistThomist]

Where has he espoused such things?

I'm sure there are more succinct articles somewhere to the same effect.

 

[RamistThomist]

My post wasn't intended to require them to hold to it, but to point out how the underlying assumptions about the place of philosophy or man's theological limits are often the reason for the polemical disagreements. It's these very commitments about the priority of Scripture or the limits of analogical knowledge that seem to drive the eclectic appropriation and modification of Thomism or Nominalism.

That's true in theory, but those of us attacking biblicism have the same underlying philosophical assumptions on theological method as the Reformed Orthodox do.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

That's true in theory, but those of us attacking biblicism have the same underlying philosophical assumptions on theological method as the Reformed Orthodox do.

I'm not saying you don't

It seems you're missing my point.

Muller's work does a good job of sort of laying out the spectrum of theologians/thinkers in the Post-Reformation Orthodox era and how different shools of thought would be polemically engaged against each other.

He does a good job of categorizing them and you can sort of see why the firction occurs.

All I'm noting is that there is often friction at the very disagreement of what is or isn't rationale (look at the discussion in this thread on analogical language). The disagreement is clear but the underlying commitments that drive them are not always examined or clear.

Pivoting to the "White case" because he's sort of a public case of this, to the outsider it can seem very simplistic. This is, in part, due to the fact that White oversimplifies it as "Thomas or bust" but it's also due to the fact that some of the people criticizing him are being just as sloppy in not being able to categorize what "school" they are in.

In fact, one would get the impression that there was sort of a uniform consensus in Protestant orthodox on methods based on some of those who appeal to a tradition. The reality is that, even though there is a majority trajectory in certain areas, the era and the methods were not monolithic.

I'm not expecting this thread to solve anything. I'm merely musing on the fact that it really does help if it's possible to lay all the cards out.

 

[Ulster Fry]

My post wasn't intended to require them to hold to it, but to point out how the underlying assumptions about the place of philosophy or man's theological limits are often the reason for the polemical disagreements. It's these very commitments about the priority of Scripture or the limits of analogical knowledge that seem to drive the eclectic appropriation and modification of Thomism or Nominalism.

You can see some of the disagreements on this thread where the cards are not completely on the table as far as the place given to human reason or methods like analytical philosophy to evaluate whether or not a doctrine is still viable.

It's not just the Biblicists that may be confused, but the metaphysicians don't seem to be aware as to why charges such as "appeals to mystery" might be met with a "...so what, that's the nature of ectypal theology...."

I think we can legitimately appeal to mystery, and Aquinas himself put the Trinity and the Incarnation in revealed knowledge which could not be deduced through natural reason. There's a profound mystery here, but we have biblical warrant for such mysteries and our faith depends on them. If someone shows an inconsistency in the Trinity and/or the Incarnation (and many try to do so, such as the unitarian philosophy Dale Tuggy), as Christians we are absolutely committed to these doctrines and must acknowledge that any inconsistency is only apparent. This is a legitimate appeal to mystery, and I agree with Bavinck that 'mystery is the lifeblood of dogmatics' given its subject matter.

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is different because it is supposedly known through natural reason, and also used to help buttress doctrines such as the Trinity and God's aseity. It is a very difficult and complicated doctrine, with many analytic Thomists writing sophisticated defences of it. Dolezal's book, for example, before he can really get to talking about DDS directly, has to spend an entire chapter on Aristotelian metaphysics (I found this a major problem in trying to talk to lay people about DDS). It also lacks the biblical and creedal warrant that the Trinity and Incarnation share. I can be a Christian who denies DDS (there have been many in the last century alone), but I cannot be a Christian who denies Christ's deity.

For some Thomists, when they reach the modal collapse issue where a genuine inconsistency is presented, they pull out the mystery card. The problem here is that DDS is supposed to be deduced from reason and also used to defend other doctrines. If it is incoherent and/or inconsistent, then it fails both purposes. Typically, in philosophy, if an inconsistency is demonstrated and recognised (here the tension between God's freedom and God's simplicity) one has to amend one's position or concede that it is false. For that reason I think the mystery card isn't viable here.

 

[Ulster Fry]

In fact, one would get the impression that there was sort of a uniform consensus in Protestant orthodox on methods based on some of those who appeal to a tradition. The reality is that, even though there is a majority trajectory in certain areas, the era and the methods were not monolithic.

I'm not expecting this thread to solve anything. I'm merely musing on the fact that it really does help if it's possible to lay all the cards out.

I also think this is completely correct, and I do feel that I was sold some false advertising by those on the retrieval side a bit. Stuff about Christian Platonism, everyone being a realist in the tradition, the Protestant Scholastics all being Thomists, and a general embrace of philosophy/metaphysics (Luther and Owen both have very strong things to say against the misuse of philosophy in theology).

 

[jwright82]

It's not a rhetorical trick, it's literally called the law of excluded middle in logic. Please look it up.

On our specific example, do I understand what he means when he tells me his wife is nice, who I have never met, or do I not? I'm not asking whether I might later find out that he's lying, that he was wrong, etc. I am asking, when he tells me his wife is nice, who I have never met, do I understand what he means? That is a yes or no question. Politicians might not follow the law of excluded middle, but we probably should.

"Please look it up" that seems a bit of an unnecessary blow. He's referring to the either/or fallacy. I also think it's strange that you use a fallacy to defend a logical law like the law of excluded middle.
So if I understand your point analogical language is false because only univocal or equivocal language exists, yes or no right? I would absolutely agree with you if two conditions could be shown to be true:
1. The Clarkian (assuming I understand him)/enlightenment/modernist philosophy of language is true.
2. That Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" (essentially one long defense of analogical use of language) is false.
Now a bit of speculation, I seem to remember (correct me if I'm wrong) you claiming Thomas invented the analogical use of language. Am I right there? Having been married, raised a daughter, have a mother, have ex-girlfriends, and work in a female dominant career the analogical nature of language is the reason for the battle of sexes. It's not as though the battle started when some monk invented analogy, it was going on since Adam and Eve.

 

[jwright82]

I think we can legitimately appeal to mystery, and Aquinas himself put the Trinity and the Incarnation in revealed knowledge which could not be deduced through natural reason. There's a profound mystery here, but we have biblical warrant for such mysteries and our faith depends on them. If someone shows an inconsistency in the Trinity and/or the Incarnation (and many try to do so, such as the unitarian philosophy Dale Tuggy), as Christians we are absolutely committed to these doctrines and must acknowledge that any inconsistency is only apparent. This is a legitimate appeal to mystery, and I agree with Bavinck that 'mystery is the lifeblood of dogmatics' given its subject matter.

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is different because it is supposedly known through natural reason, and also used to help buttress doctrines such as the Trinity and God's aseity. It is a very difficult and complicated doctrine, with many analytic Thomists writing sophisticated defences of it. Dolezal's book, for example, before he can really get to talking about DDS directly, has to spend an entire chapter on Aristotelian metaphysics (I found this a major problem in trying to talk to lay people about DDS). It also lacks the biblical and creedal warrant that the Trinity and Incarnation share. I can be a Christian who denies DDS (there have been many in the last century alone), but I cannot be a Christian who denies Christ's deity.

For some Thomists, when they reach the modal collapse issue where a genuine inconsistency is presented, they pull out the mystery card. The problem here is that DDS is supposed to be deduced from reason and also used to defend other doctrines. If it is incoherent and/or inconsistent, then it fails both purposes. Typically, in philosophy, if an inconsistency is demonstrated and recognised (here the tension between God's freedom and God's simplicity) one has to amend one's position or concede that it is false. For that reason I think the mystery card isn't viable here.

Completely agree with your arguments about freedom vs simplicity. But I think Rich is correct too. You're right if God is subject to the laws of logic. But he's not and I think that's Rich's point. Logic is a creational thing, it's something we use to understand creation. That's why the archetypal/ectypal distinction is necessary to understand how far reason and revelation can accurately describe God. So your argument stands or falls on the proposition "God is subject to the laws of logic".

 

[Ulster Fry]

"Please look it up" that seems a bit of an unnecessary blow. He's referring to the either/or fallacy. I also think it's strange that you use a fallacy to defend a logical law like the law of excluded middle.
So if I understand your point analogical language is false because only univocal or equivocal language exists, yes or no right? I would absolutely agree with you if two conditions could be shown to be true:
1. The Clarkian (assuming I understand him)/enlightenment/modernist philosophy of language is true.
2. That Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" (essentially one long defense of analogical use of language) is false.
Now a bit of speculation, I seem to remember (correct me if I'm wrong) you claiming Thomas invented the analogical use of language. Am I right there? Having been married, raised a daughter, have a mother, have ex-girlfriends, and work in a female dominant career the analogical nature of language is the reason for the battle of sexes. It's not as though the battle started when some monk invented analogy, it was going on since Adam and Eve.

Didn't mean it to be. I'm also not sure what you mean by using a fallacy to defend a logical law. P or not P is the law of excluded middle. So what I was trying to argue is that P (I understand what you mean) or not P (I don't understand what you mean). I guess in the specific case of saying that analogical language is either reducible to univocal language or equivocal language, that could be accused of committing an either/or fallacy, but then I'm defending that based on the law of excluded middle, not the other way round. If analogical language is a legitimate separate irreducible category, I think an account needs to be made as to how one can get away with not transgressing the law of excluded middle in the way I mentioned above. If there is goodness A which applies to creatures, and goodness B which applies to God, then the meaning is not the same and we have a problem in uniting the two concepts. This also becomes a problem if I wanted to say God is better than x, which could be paraphrased (though less grammatically pleasing in English) as 'more good than'. In fact, and the Hebrew scholars can correct me if I'm mistaken, such a comparative is used in exactly this literal sense in Biblical Hebrew of 'more good than' which we translate as 'better'. But if we aren't using the same concept of 'goodness', this makes little sense. I think the Bible is using 'good' with the same general meaning in both cases. But this does not commit us to any kind of univocity of being. The motto here is not to read ontology off of language.

On your other points, I don't know enough about Clark's view to be able to answer that, and I haven't read enough of Philosophical Investigations to know what Wittgenstein is saying about analogical language. I think the standard view was developed by Thomas Aquinas, yes, but I have no doubt there are precursors to it (such as Augustine). And further development since then by Thomists (such as the distinction between analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution). Not sure about your battle of the sexes point, but my real question there is whether the Biblical authors are using language in that way. For example, does tov mean one thing when predicated of God, and another when predicated of creatures. I don't think so.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Completely agree with your arguments about freedom vs simplicity. But I think Rich is correct too. You're right if God is subject to the laws of logic. But he's not and I think that's Rich's point. Logic is a creational thing, it's something we use to understand creation. That's why the archetypal/ectypal distinction is necessary to understand how far reason and revelation can accurately describe God. So your argument stands or falls on the proposition "God is subject to the laws of logic".

I wouldn't put it that way, but I would say that God is a consistent/rational being and hence does not contravene the laws of logic (which I do not think exist in some Platonic realm either). Otherwise, DDS is the last of our troubles and now we have to figure out how to put the breaks on without being committed to absurdities such as that God can both exist and not exist at the same time, that God can make 2+2=5, declare all true propositions false, etc.

 

[Ploutos]

For example, does tov mean one thing when predicated of God, and another when predicated of creatures. I don't think so.

Does whatever Hebrew word is translated as "arm" mean one thing when used in reference to a human and another thing when used in reference to God?

 

[SeanPatrickCornell]

Didn't mean it to be. I'm also not sure what you mean by using a fallacy to defend a logical law. P or not P is the law of excluded middle.

I don't want to speak for Jamey but when you said "Law of Excluded Middle", I assumed you were talking about the "Fallacy of the Excluded Middle", and I got confused. But now as I've looked it up, it makes more sense and I learned something.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Does whatever Hebrew word is translated as "arm" mean one thing when used in reference to a human and another thing when used in reference to God?

Yes it does, it means 'arm' in both cases, though it is being used metaphorically with reference to God and literally with reference to humans. Otherwise, I would be reading it as meaning 'arm as it pertains to humans' in one sense, and then 'arm as it pertains to God' in the other.

 

[Ploutos]

Yes it does, it means 'arm' in both cases, though it is being used metaphorically with reference to God and literally with reference to humans. Otherwise, I would be reading it as meaning 'arm as it pertains to humans' in one sense, and then 'arm as it pertains to God' in the other.

I would argue that it doesn't mean exactly the same thing by virtue of being literal in one instance and metaphorical in another.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I don't want to speak for Jamey but when you said "Law of Excluded Middle", I assumed you were talking about the "Fallacy of the Excluded Middle", and I got confused. But now as I've looked it up, it makes more sense and I learned something.

Sorry if I wasn't clear. Jamey might still push back on me on this point so I await his reply.

 

[SeanPatrickCornell]

I would argue that it doesn't mean exactly the same thing by virtue of being literal in one instance and metaphorical in another.

Right, but I think the point is that even though one is a literal arm and one is a metaphorical arm, "arm" still means "arm" in both cases and not "machine gun" or "mashed potato" or "isosceles triangle".

If I am following the metaphysics / philosophy correctly.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Right, but I think the point is that even though one is a literal arm and one is a metaphorical arm, "arm" still means "arm" in both cases and not "machine gun" or "mashed potato" or "isosceles triangle".

If I am following the metaphysics / philosophy correctly.

Yes, that's exactly what I think. Otherwise the metaphor wouldn't work as we would be using two different concepts of 'arm'.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I wouldn't put it that way, but I would say that God is a consistent/rational being and hence does not contravene the laws of logic (which I do not think exist in some Platonic realm either). Otherwise, DDS is the last of our troubles and now we have to figure out how to put the breaks on without being committed to absurdities such as that God can both exist and not exist at the same time, that God can make 2+2=5, declare all true propositions false, etc.

I don't know if you've read Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics Vol 1 but I think you are confusing the limits of ectypal theology with human logic.

I think one of the interesting aspects of the period is that certain groups (e.g. the Lutherans) tacked so hard against the limits of reason that they held that revealed theological truths can be subject at all to a process of reason. Thus, the ubiquity of the human body of Christ was taken as a theological truth that needed no further "error checking".

Most on the Reformed side (though not all) confessed a theology accommodated to creatures (ectypal) to be distinguished from archetypal theology that is the Creator's knowledge of Himself. It wasn't a quantitative but a qualitative difference. It's not that our knowledge that is revealed of God is equivocal to what God knows, but neither is it of the same kind. It is also a true theology so that it is subject to the use of reason to put things together logically and systematically but reason is not the starting point (nor is natural theology.

I suppose, ore than anything, it is a disposition toward the pursuit of theological knowledge to recognize that, no matter how hard we try, we cann never penetrate the Divine mystery and must be content with what God lends to us. This is what I try to explain to my kids because today we are subjected to all sorts of accounts of what must be entailed of God if we are to uphold certain "inviolable truths" of human reason Part of what Muller unpacks is the use of human philosophy to build up Arminian theology from certain things that they reasoned of God. We see this in William Lane Craig who begins with a human reason that neither his concept of what it means taht God is loving or that man is free is true unless he leverages Molinism to satisfy his philosophical mind that God has lived up to his expectations. Saying that Craig believes his theology is univocal to God's (which he admitted to Horton years ago) is to say that he really believes taht God thinks of things in the same way qualitatively as he does.

In other words, it's not so much the use of logic to ensure that our creaturely theology is coherent that's in question. It's respecting the Creatorr/creature distinction at the point at which one embarks upon thological inquiry.

 

[jwright82]

Didn't mean it to be. I'm also not sure what you mean by using a fallacy to defend a logical law. P or not P is the law of excluded middle. So what I was trying to argue is that P (I understand what you mean) or not P (I don't understand what you mean). I guess in the specific case of saying that analogical language is either reducible to univocal language or equivocal language, that could be accused of committing an either/or fallacy, but then I'm defending that based on the law of excluded middle, not the other way round. If analogical language is a legitimate separate irreducible category, I think an account needs to be made as to how one can get away with not transgressing the law of excluded middle in the way I mentioned above. If there is goodness A which applies to creatures, and goodness B which applies to God, then the meaning is not the same and we have a problem in uniting the two concepts. This also becomes a problem if I wanted to say God is better than x, which could be paraphrased (though less grammatically pleasing in English) as 'more good than'. In fact, and the Hebrew scholars can correct me if I'm mistaken, such a comparative is used in exactly this literal sense in Biblical Hebrew of 'more good than' which we translate as 'better'. But if we aren't using the same concept of 'goodness', this makes little sense. I think the Bible is using 'good' with the same general meaning in both cases. But this does not commit us to any kind of univocity of being. The motto here is not to read ontology off of language.

On your other points, I don't know enough about Clark's view to be able to answer that, and I haven't read enough of Philosophical Investigations to know what Wittgenstein is saying about analogical language. I think the standard view was developed by Thomas Aquinas, yes, but I have no doubt there are precursors to it (such as Augustine). And further development since then by Thomists (such as the distinction between analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution). Not sure about your battle of the sexes point, but my real question there is whether the Biblical authors are using language in that way. For example, does tov mean one thing when predicated of God, and another when predicated of creatures. I don't think so.

I'll work sort of in reverse. The quip about battle of the sexes was a tongue in cheek practical application of Wittgenstein's point and the failure of the Modernist account of language. In that it overlooked how analogical everyday ordinary uses of language are. Analogical is an essential aspect of language. I don't think, per Wittgenstein, that everyday ordinary language that violates that law all time needs a defense. We all can get by way of analogy what someone is getting at without exhaustively understanding it.
When you say things like "I either do or I don't understand" you're artificially placing that strict reduction of ordinary language to a modernist myth of rigid logical perfection or close to it. That's the either/or fallacy. To try to defend the fallacy by appealing to a logical law is confusing to say the least.
You're welcome to revive the dead theories of Russell, Moore, and the Logical Positivists but you need to refute the criticisms of that view of language as well. We left them dead for good reason.
Without analogy your view reduces to either univocalism, which can easily be disproven, or pure equivocation. Which do you prefer?
Here's an example when you say understand p what do you mean by "understand"?

 

[jwright82]

I wouldn't put it that way, but I would say that God is a consistent/rational being and hence does not contravene the laws of logic (which I do not think exist in some Platonic realm either). Otherwise, DDS is the last of our troubles and now we have to figure out how to put the breaks on without being committed to absurdities such as that God can both exist and not exist at the same time, that God can make 2+2=5, declare all true propositions false, etc.

But since logic is an aspect of creation we can only use it to understand created things. That's why scripture, divine revelation, is a creational thing (unique to be sure) that we use to understand God but in human concepts and language and we may not go beyond that, Rich's point. Analogy is the recognition of this limitation and adaptation to it.

 

[Ploutos]

But since logic is an aspect of creation we can only use it to understand created things. That's why scripture, divine revelation, is a creational thing (unique to be sure) that we use to understand God but in human concepts and language and we may not go beyond that, Rich's point. Analogy is the recognition of this limitation and adaptation to it.

Just to clarify (because I'm having PTSD flashbacks about a previous thread) - @jwright82 I think you would agree with this - saying the laws of logic will not help us to fully understand God does not mean things like (for instance) that we can disregard the law of non-contradiction when it comes to God. God cannot be God and not-God for instance. God is not subject to the laws of logic but neither are two contradictory things true of him at once.

 

[SeanPatrickCornell]

Just to clarify (because I'm having PTSD flashbacks about a previous thread) - @jwright82 I think you would agree with this - saying the laws of logic will not help us to fully understand God does not mean things like (for instance) that we can disregard the law of non-contradiction when it comes to God. God cannot be God and not-God for instance. God is not subject to the laws of logic but neither are two contradictory things true of him at once.

To be fair, I don't think this language of God being subject or not subject to the laws of logic is particularly helpful.

I think it's more accurate and helpful to say that the laws of logic are a reflection God's own perfection and His own "God-rules" being imposed on the universe.

It's like saying that God is or is not subject to His own moral laws: It misses the point. God isn't "subject" to His own moral law; the moral law is a reflection of God's own nature and character. God cannot lie, not because God's law forbids lying, but because by God's nature (truth), lying is impossible for God. The law against lying is a reflection of that.

Likewise, God isn't "subject" to the law of non-contradtiction, rather the law of non-contradiction is and exists because it reflects the nature, will, and character of God.

Does that make sense or is this so elementary that everyone is like, "Duh, Sean. We know!"

 

[Ulster Fry]

But since logic is an aspect of creation we can only use it to understand created things. That's why scripture, divine revelation, is a creational thing (unique to be sure) that we use to understand God but in human concepts and language and we may not go beyond that, Rich's point. Analogy is the recognition of this limitation and adaptation to it.

I'll just address both your comments here, starting with this statement. Okay, so why bother doing theology at all? We can't understand God, because we can't use logic to understand God. We've moved well beyond Aquinas and I feel like we're becoming Barthians now.

Can you give me a clear example of how we use analogical language all the time, and thereby are speaking using different concepts all the time? That sounds like we would struggle to say anything meaningful at all if it language were in such flux.

I have no idea what logical positivism has to do with it. I'm sure that you are aware that the rebirth of philosophy of religion by analytic philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century was in response to the logical positivists? I doubt many will be your allies in dismissing things like the law of excluded middle or taking your view of logic.

If you are asking me to explain what I mean by 'understand what someone means'...it is either the case that, when someone says something like 'such and such is good', the predication 'is good' is being used in such a way that I recognise what is being stated, or I do not. For example, if the concept is different as it pertains to creatures, and different as it pertains to God, then I no longer understand what we mean by 'good', because we are using 'good' in different senses.

Furthermore, on the point that all of our concepts are creaturely, as you acknowledge, from where then are we getting these concepts as they are applied uniquely to God (such as goodness as it pertains to God)?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I'll just address both your comments here, starting with this statement. Okay, so why bother doing theology at all? We can't understand God, because we can't use logic to understand God. We've moved well beyond Aquinas and I feel like we're becoming Barthians now.

My comments?

If you're asking me, then the Reformed Orthodox conception of creaturely theology wasn't that we just decided to "do theology" but that God has revealed Himself to creatures. Without this Revelation, we can have no true knowledge of God. We cannot use human reason to "reason up" to true theology. It requires Divine Condescension (see the WCF on the Covenants).

By the way, I'm sorry for all the typos. I don't see very well.

 

[Ploutos]

I'll just address both your comments here, starting with this statement. Okay, so why bother doing theology at all? We can't understand God, because we can't use logic to understand God. We've moved well beyond Aquinas and I feel like we're becoming Barthians now.

This is more either-or-ism. Either we can understand God or we shouldn't bother doing theology at all. I reject that either-or fallacy. There is no need to force a choice between univocity and apophaticism.

Can you give me a clear example of how we use analogical language all the time, and thereby are speaking using different concepts all the time? That sounds like we would struggle to say anything meaningful at all if it language were in such flux.

We keep trying but you keep dismissing our examples.

 

[Ploutos]

To be fair, I don't think this language of God being subject or not subject to the laws of logic is particularly helpful.

I think it's more accurate and helpful to say that the laws of logic are a reflection God's own perfection and His own "God-rules" being imposed on the universe.

It's like saying that God is or is not subject to His own moral laws: It misses the point. God isn't "subject" to His own moral law; the moral law is a reflection of God's own nature and character. God cannot lie, not because God's law forbids lying, but because by God's nature (truth), lying is impossible for God. The law against lying is a reflection of that.

Likewise, God isn't "subject" to the law of non-contradtiction, rather the law of non-contradiction is and exists because it reflects the nature, will, and character of God.

Does that make sense or is this so elementary that everyone is like, "Duh, Sean. We know!"

Yes, that is very helpful. You did a much better job than I did of explaining what I was trying to get at. Thank you! (Sidebar, threads like this give me sympathy for my wife when I realize how poor a communicator I am!)

 

[Ulster Fry]

My comments?

If you're asking me, then the Reformed Orthodox conception of creaturely theology wasn't that we just decided to "do theology" but that God has revealed Himself to creatures. Without this Revelation, we can have no true knowledge of God. We cannot use human reason to "reason up" to true theology. It requires Divine Condescension (see the WCF on the Covenants).

By the way, I'm sorry for all the typos. I don't see very well.

I was replying to Jamey but I appreciate your answer. My point is - can we understand revelation without reason? We are rational beings.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I was replying to Jamey but I appreciate your answer. My point is - can we understand revelation without reason? We are rational beings.

I think the Reformed Confessions would confess that in order for us to properly apprehend true theology, we would need to be regenerated first.

That said, ectypal theology (true theology that God has revealed to creatures) is not contradictory. In other words, it is appropriate to use reason. The Confessions, for example, rightly point out that transubstantiation is repugnant to human reason.

Human sin, however, does cloud our use of reason and our ability to arrive at a perfect ectypal theology. That's why we're not all Presbyterian.

BTW, I think there are aspects of God's Revelation to us that are sort of supra-rational. I'm not being Barthian here because they don't even acknowledge that Scripture is a true Revelation of God. What I'm saying is that we experience certain things in ways that are too wonderful for words.

 

[Ulster Fry]

This is more either-or-ism. Either we can understand God or we shouldn't bother doing theology at all. I reject that either-or fallacy. There is no need to force a choice between univocity and apophaticism.



We keep trying but you keep dismissing our examples.

But, in all sincerity, how can we do theology if we can't understand God? How can I study something if I am incapable of understanding it? I don't mean exhaustive understanding. The claim was that we can't use logic (and reason which is strongly correlated) as a tool to understand God. What else are we using then?

But clearly I can understand things about God, such as that 'God exists'. Again, I understand what is meant by this statement, clearly, though the manner of God's existence is beyond my finite understanding. If we can't agree on this, well, Jordan Peterson will be pleased.

I'm sorry, but I haven't found your examples compelling and have explained why. I don't think you are using different concepts in the instances given.

 

[Ploutos]

But, in all sincerity, how can we do theology if we can't understand God? How can I study something if I am incapable of understanding it? I don't mean exhaustive understanding. The claim was that we can't use logic (and reason which is strongly correlated) as a tool to understand God. What else are we using then?

But clearly I can understand things about God, such as that 'God exists'. Again, I understand what is meant by this statement, clearly, though the manner of God's existence is beyond my finite understanding. If we can't agree on this, well, Jordan Peterson will be pleased.

I'm sorry, but I haven't found your examples compelling and have explained why. I don't think you are using different concepts in the instances given.

Nobody is saying we can't understand God and this is a straw man. We cannot understand God exhaustively. We cannot understand God as he understands himself because of the creator-creature distinction. We can understand things about God analogically.

Nobody is saying we are incapable of understanding God. We are incapable of understanding God as he understands himself but we can understand him analogically.

We can use logic and reason to understand things about God analogically but we cannot use them to understand God exhaustively or as he understands himself.