The "Great Tradition" and Post Reformation Orthodoxy

[RamistThomist]

I tried to hint at some differences between Thomas and the Reformed on this issue.

A Primer on Ectypal Theology

I first discovered ectypal theology from Richard Muller’s Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. Rather than being an academic topic, ectypal theology unites theological method with Christology. I’ve done pieces on ectypal theology in the past, but the following from Willem Van Asselt’s...

puritanboard.com

 

[py3ak]

‘Without body, parts, or passions’ is the shorthand in the major Protestant confessions.

I do hold to this. But I don’t need DDS as I’ve described above to do it.

As you’ve brought it up, could you define clearly what ‘parts’ means here?

It sounds like I need to clarify my post a little bit:

1) When you used the language of "if you want to hold to simplicity" it was possible that the reference was to a full Thomistic account, which is why I posted in a general way. But it was also possible that the reference was to simplicity more broadly. The shorthand statement can easily come across as not including an affirmation of Westminster.
2) Unless someone can affirm that God is "without parts" as Westminster meant it, or that God is simple as the Belgic Confession meant it, they don't meet the standard for participation on this Board.
3) Therefore language that suggests that simplicity is optional is inaccurate, as far as discussions on here go, as is any language that suggests that it is unbiblical.

You'll notice I'm not acceding to your request to define "parts." The reason is that my purpose at present is not to discuss simplicity, but to make clear that the confessional boundaries remain where they have always been. In parliamentary terms, I raised a point of order rather than chiming in on the debate.

Having raised the point of order, though, perhaps I can add that I the confessional boundaries of the discussion meet with my hearty agreement in this regard, the documents and concerns you've referenced notwithstanding.

I trust you'll excuse the observation that contemporary metaphysics, like any rarefied pursuit, can become its own little hothouse community where some things are evident, or well-known, or unquestioned, but that prove underwhelming to those outside of the community. Any given community, of course, can always respond to that by saying that they alone are the cognoscenti with adequate knowledge of a given topic. And those outside the community are free to be untroubled by this judgment, and to think that the members have tied themselves up in some unnecessary knots.

The statement that if God's will is identical with his existence, then the objects of God's will are necessary, is profoundly uncompelling to me. God wills himself necessarily, all other things freely. God is nothing but himself. For years I have been pleased with the way Heppe summarized this matter: "Since then the divine will is the actuosity of the divine being eternally identical with itself, which only to man appears an infinite manifold of expressions of will, it may be said that in the same act of will God may will otherwise but not that He may otherwise will."
[Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 82]

 

[Ploutos]

Second, the historical sources which you mention (I should stress that I was educated in a Reformed college and have read a lot of them, particularly Turretin) are capable of committing logical fallacies just as you are. Being historical doesn’t equate being correct. How they tried to bypass this issue was by making a distinction between hypothetical and metaphysical necessity, and again I refer you to what I linked above as to why this doesn’t work. If what is being argued is that ‘God decrees x, therefore necessarily x’ then that is fallacious. The correct view is ‘God decrees x, therefore x’. But you’ve already conceded this point, as you’ve acknowledged that God could have decreed otherwise. So if God can will otherwise (I’m not pulling a bait and switch here by now taking of will, obviously) then how can God be identical to His will? That would mean that God is God A in world w where he decrees x, and God B in world w’ where he degrees y. You claim God’s will could be otherwise, but not His existence (I would assume), but these two are identical. That’s a contradiction.

@Ulster Fry can you succinctly tell us (in plain language that simpletons such as myself can understand) whether you believe that we know things analogically or univocally? You seem to be building arguments that entail a belief in univocal knowledge.

 

[Ulster Fry]

@Ulster Fry can you succinctly tell us (in plain language that simpletons such as myself can understand) whether you believe that we know things analogically or univocally? You seem to be building arguments that entail a belief in univocal knowledge.

It's entirely irrelevant to the problem of modal collapse. However, I will still say what I think on this (bear in mind that until very recently I was a Reformed Thomist). It is interesting that you say univocal knowledge. The problem Dolezal etc raise is a problem with univocity of being. I think these two get mixed up.

The reality is that analogical language is really going to be reducible either to equivocal language or univocal language. Either we mean the same thing by, for example, 'goodness' when we speak of God being good or creatures being good or we don't. If we don't, we are grasping at thin air to speak of God. If we do mean the same thing, however, that does not mean that we are committed to saying that God is good and creatures are good in the same way/manner/mode. I can understand, completely, what someone means when they say God is good, without being able to fully grasp/comprehend God's infinite goodness. Otherwise we have to adopt a very strong apophaticism (I almost went this route, influenced by the Thomists Brian Davies and Herbert McCabe).

Here's an example. If I say that 'I have a good dog' and 'I have a good wife', I'm clearly not saying that they are good in the same way. However, I am using the word 'good' in the typical way in both statements which would be understood by everyone. I think the Bible also uses language in this simple way.

 

[Ulster Fry]

It sounds like I need to clarify my post a little bit:

1) When you used the language of "if you want to hold to simplicity" it was possible that the reference was to a full Thomistic account, which is why I posted in a general way. But it was also possible that the reference was to simplicity more broadly. The shorthand statement can easily come across as not including an affirmation of Westminster.
2) Unless someone can affirm that God is "without parts" as Westminster meant it, or that God is simple as the Belgic Confession meant it, they don't meet the standard for participation on this Board.
3) Therefore language that suggests that simplicity is optional is inaccurate, as far as discussions on here go, as is any language that suggests that it is unbiblical.

You'll notice I'm not acceding to your request to define "parts." The reason is that my purpose at present is not to discuss simplicity, but to make clear that the confessional boundaries remain where they have always been. In parliamentary terms, I raised a point of order rather than chiming in on the debate.

Having raised the point of order, though, perhaps I can add that I the confessional boundaries of the discussion meet with my hearty agreement in this regard, the documents and concerns you've referenced notwithstanding.

I trust you'll excuse the observation that contemporary metaphysics, like any rarefied pursuit, can become its own little hothouse community where some things are evident, or well-known, or unquestioned, but that prove underwhelming to those outside of the community. Any given community, of course, can always respond to that by saying that they alone are the cognoscenti with adequate knowledge of a given topic. And those outside the community are free to be untroubled by this judgment, and to think that the members have tied themselves up in some unnecessary knots.

The statement that if God's will is identical with his existence, then the objects of God's will are necessary, is profoundly uncompelling to me. God wills himself necessarily, all other things freely. God is nothing but himself. For years I have been pleased with the way Heppe summarized this matter: "Since then the divine will is the actuosity of the divine being eternally identical with itself, which only to man appears an infinite manifold of expressions of will, it may be said that in the same act of will God may will otherwise but not that He may otherwise will."
[Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 82]

I'll try and respond to all of this quickly.

First, it sounds like Charles Hodge might struggle to become a member of PB based on this. Which is absurd. And I also doubt, particularly until the last decade or so in which classical theism and Aquinas has been in vogue, that many of the members on PB over its history would have much of an idea what DDS actually commits them to (or care about such arcane matters).

Second, you can dismiss contemporary metaphysics/logic/philosophy/analytic theology all you want. That's your prerogative. But your comments on things being 'evident', 'well-known', 'unquestioned' displays a comical lack of understanding what is going on in those fields. As for people tying themselves in unnecessary knots, not only should you inform all of the Thomists doing work in this area (including James Dolezal and some other Reformed guys) but also Thomas Aquinas for spending so much time trying to explicate the doctrine in the Aristotelian framework of his day. In fact if you could demonstrate there's no real issue here, you should try and get it published. You'll become a philosophical/theological sensation overnight, particularly to the Thomist community. You have no idea how many papers are being published on this topic.

Third, this doesn't work (I defended this as a viable option for my thesis):

God wills himself necessarily, all other things freely

Okay, now we have two distinct wills in God. God's necessary will, in which He wills Himself, and God's contingent will, in which He freely wills creatures. Or we have a contradiction, as if you claim that there is only one will in God, which is identical to Himself, then we have God's necessary will = God's contingent will. This transgresses the law of identity (you can say this is uncompelling etc, but Aquinas himself would sooner drop dead before allowing such a clear logical contradiction). Or maybe you'll deny that any of this is what you are claiming. God's will is that by which He wills Himself, end of story. So then I will ask, what is it that determines God's creating one world from another? Either it is God's will, in which God wills one world and not another, or it isn't. If it isn't, then God does not create anything freely, as it is not an act of will. At this point we are running closer to God being the One of Plotinus.

On the law of identity, I should also point out now that people using biblical verses such as 'God is love' to support DDS are making the unwarranted and almost certainly wrong assumption that the biblical authors are using the 'is' of identity. They aren't (or else we could also say that 'love is God'). They are using the 'is' of predication. So this cannot be used as an entailment for DDS.

 

[Ploutos]

It's entirely irrelevant to the problem of modal collapse. However, I will still say what I think on this (bear in mind that until very recently I was a Reformed Thomist). It is interesting that you say univocal knowledge. The problem Dolezal etc raise is a problem with univocity of being. I think these two get mixed up.

Univocal knowledge implies a more univocal view of being, as it is predicated upon a blurring of the creator-creature distinction.

The reality is that analogical language is really going to be reducible either to equivocal language or univocal language.

No, that's not the reality. Analogical language is its very own thing. This is why I asked if you hold to a univocal view, and I see now that my suspicion was correct, which explains a lot. Analogical language is true insofar as it goes. It's not apophatic because analogical knowledge is true knowledge. It's not univocal because there is a creator-creature distinction that prevents us from knowing fully. But what we know, we do in fact know truly if not completely.

I'm sensing a lot of reductionism and oversimplification here.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Univocal knowledge implies a more univocal view of being, as it is predicated upon a blurring of the creator-creature distinction.


No, that's not the reality. Analogical language is its very own thing. This is why I asked if you hold to a univocal view, and I see now that my suspicion was correct, which explains a lot. Analogical language is true insofar as it goes. It's not apophatic because analogical knowledge is true knowledge. It's not univocal because there is a creator-creature distinction that prevents us from knowing fully. But what we know, we do in fact know truly if not completely.

I'm sensing a lot of reductionism and oversimplification here.

Did you read what I wrote? Where did I say that we know anything 'fully'? Otherwise, this is just all wrong as you're mixing up epistemology and ontology. Have you ever read Duns Scotus' criticism of Aquinas' use of analogical language? How contemporary Thomists interpret it today (and the disagreements amongst Thomists on this)? Some agree with me that it is ultimately reducible to a kind of univocity in the realm of language (asserting that this implies univocity of being is just question begging). You're certainly right there's an oversimplification going on here. And, by the way, you asked me to give you my view in simple terms, so why are you criticising me when I tried to do so?

And again, please define what analogical language is, clearly, and how we can therefore meaningfully speak of goodness as it pertains to creatures, and goodness as it pertains to God, when these two things are not the same. I've given you a simplified version of my solution, let's see yours.

Edit - I have a further question. Do you think that the biblical authors had the same understanding of analogical language as you are defending (which was developed by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century)? When the Bible describes God as being agathos or tov, the author is intending a special meaning when applied to God as when those same words are used in other parts of Scripture? If so, better contact the editors of BDAG (standard NT Greek lexicon) because I can't see it. Happy to be shown otherwise.

 

[Ploutos]

Did you read what I wrote? Where did I say that we know anything 'fully'?

And I quote:

"The reality is that analogical language is really going to be reducible either to equivocal language or univocal language."

You then went on to say:

"Either we mean the same thing by, for example, 'goodness' when we speak of God being good or creatures being good or we don't."

So yes, I did read what you wrote. Did you read what you wrote?

 

[Ulster Fry]

And I quote:

"The reality is that analogical language is really going to be reducible either to equivocal language or univocal language."

You then went on to say:

"Either we mean the same thing by, for example, 'goodness' when we speak of God being good or creatures being good or we don't."

So yes, I did read what you wrote. Did you read what you wrote?

Keep reading:

The reality is that analogical language is really going to be reducible either to equivocal language or univocal language. Either we mean the same thing by, for example, 'goodness' when we speak of God being good or creatures being good or we don't. If we don't, we are grasping at thin air to speak of God. If we do mean the same thing, however, that does not mean that we are committed to saying that God is good and creatures are good in the same way/manner/mode. I can understand, completely, what someone means when they say God is good, without being able to fully grasp/comprehend God's infinite goodness.

 

[Ploutos]

Keep reading:

I did. You seem to be saying you completely understand what someone says when they say something that can't be completely understood. How would you like me to respond to such an assertion?

 

[Ulster Fry]

I did. You seem to be saying you completely understand what someone says when they say something that can't be completely understood. How would you like me to respond to such an assertion?

I'll give you an example that shouldn't be too difficult to grasp. Let's say a mathematician or physicist is explaining to me how precisely the universe is finely tuned and says 'the constant for this particular state of the universe is 10 to the power of 123, which is a really big number'. I understand exactly what he means when he says the number is 'really big'. I have absolutely no ability to grasp or comprehend such a figure. I truly understand the language, but I cannot fully know/comprehend/(whatever word you prefer) the reality of it because I am finite.

Instead of your banana emojis (?) why don't you show the same courtesy in answering my questions addressed to you as I've done in trying to answer yours?

 

[RamistThomist]

I'll give you an example that shouldn't be too difficult to grasp. Let's say a mathematician or physicist is explaining to me how precisely the universe is finely tuned and says 'the constant for this particular state of the universe is 10 to the power of 123, which is a really big number'. I understand exactly what he means when he says the number is 'really big'. I have absolutely no ability to grasp or comprehend such a figure. I truly understand the language, but I cannot fully know/comprehend/(whatever word you prefer) the reality of it because I am finite.

Are you familiar with Andrew Radde-Galwitz's work? He notes how the Cappadocians used the concept of epinoia and said something similar to what you just said.

 

[Ploutos]

I'll give you an example that shouldn't be too difficult to grasp. Let's say a mathematician or physicist is explaining to me how precisely the universe is finely tuned and says 'the constant for this particular state of the universe is 10 to the power of 123, which is a really big number'. I understand exactly what he means when he says the number is 'really big'. I have absolutely no ability to grasp or comprehend such a figure. I truly understand the language, but I cannot fully know/comprehend/(whatever word you prefer) the reality of it because I am finite.

Instead of your banana emojis (?) why don't you show the same courtesy in answering my questions addressed to you as I've done in trying to answer yours?

I assuredly disagree that courtesy has been a strong suit of yours, but I'll cop to an opportunity for more maturity on my part, so please accept my acknowledgement of that.

I don't really think that your distinction makes sense. I disagree that you can know exactly what someone means when they're talking about something you can't fully understand. You understand, of course, that the number is really big. But because you don't grasp the bigness of the number, you can't fully understand the implications of what he's saying nor can you understand it on the basis of the knowledge he brings to the table if you don't possess that knowledge. Now maybe you do have a degree of knowledge that facilitates greater understanding of the bigness of that number - for instance, you understand that 10^123 is larger than the number of atoms in the known universe (by our best estimates). Maybe you understand that it's not even just slightly larger but immensely larger than the number of atoms. All that to say - to claim univocal knowledge of an analogical statement is, if you pardon my directness, something that seems nonsensical to me. I see it as a claim to univocal knowledge. If you say that you know exactly what someone means, then you claim to know everything that they know, or everything that there is to know about the topic. Apart from being me, you can't make such a bold claim to understanding exactly what I say about earthly matters, much less matters about which neither of us have univocal knowledge.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Are you familiar with Andrew Radde-Galwitz's work? He notes how the Cappadocians used the concept of epinoia and said something similar to what you just said.

I've read his article on simplicity and the Cappadocians, but not his book. I was hoping to add it to my library but it costs a fortune, so I'll have to borrow it at some stage.

At the moment, I'm taking a break from research in philosophy of religion/analytic theology (to be honest, I'm conflicted on being graded for things I write on the doctrine of God in a secular setting and also how much it can overlap with my own faith) and looking more into the study of abstract objects (particularly the existence of numbers, sets, and the like). It ties into these theological questions a lot in an indirect way, as this thread has shown.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I assuredly disagree that courtesy has been a strong suit of yours, but I'll cop to an opportunity for more maturity on my part, so please accept my acknowledgement of that.

I don't really think that your distinction makes sense. I disagree that you can know exactly what someone means when they're talking about something you can't fully understand. You understand, of course, that the number is really big. But because you don't grasp the bigness of the number, you can't fully understand the implications of what he's saying nor can you understand it on the basis of the knowledge he brings to the table if you don't possess that knowledge. Now maybe you do have a degree of knowledge that facilitates greater understanding of the bigness of that number - for instance, you understand that 10^123 is larger than the number of atoms in the known universe (by our best estimates). Maybe you understand that it's not even just slightly larger but immensely larger than the number of atoms. All that to say - to claim univocal knowledge of an analogical statement is, if you pardon my directness, something that seems nonsensical to me. I see it as a claim to univocal knowledge. If you say that you know exactly what someone means, then you claim to know everything that they know, or everything that there is to know about the topic. Apart from being me, you can't make such a bold claim to understanding exactly what I say about earthly matters, much less matters about which neither of us have univocal knowledge.

Okay, here's another example to show that that is patently false. My friend tells me he's married to Elizabeth and that she's really nice. I understand exactly what he intends at the level of language, and understand him perfectly. But I've never met Elizabeth. I know nothing about her. But according to you, if I say that I know exactly what someone means, I am claiming to know everything he knows about her. Which is absurd.

 

[Ploutos]

Okay, here's another example to show that that is patently false. My friend tells me he's married to Elizabeth and that she's really nice. I understand exactly what he intends at the level of language, and understand him perfectly. But I've never met Elizabeth. I know nothing about her. But according to you, if I say that I know exactly what someone means, I am claiming to know everything he knows about her. Which is absurd.

I agree that it is absurd, but it also seems to me that is what you are saying, which is why I'm disagreeing. Let's say you've never met Elizabeth and this is a not-particularly-close friend. You don't understand him perfectly. You have a basic superficial understanding of what he said that is accurate up to a point. You can't know exactly what he means. There are all sorts of limiting factors to your knowledge of what he means.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I agree that it is absurd, but it also seems to me that is what you are saying, which is why I'm disagreeing. Let's say you've never met Elizabeth and this is a not-particularly-close friend. You don't understand him perfectly. You have a basic superficial understanding of what he said that is accurate up to a point. You can't know exactly what he means. There are all sorts of limiting factors to your knowledge of what he means.

Okay, so what I should be saying to my friend when he says 'I have a wife Elizabeth, she is really nice' is the following:

'I've never met Elizabeth, so I don't know what you mean'.

I wonder how my friend would react to that. But clearly, we both know that isn't how language works. Of course I know what he means, and I don't have to have met her to know what he means.

 

[RamistThomist]

Focusing on other aspects of the Great Tradition, but a few words on simplicity:

1) The Confessions affirm it.
2) The Thomist formulation needs a good response to the modal collapse.
3) It is not immediately clear how Thomist the Confessional view is.

The Platonic angle is very interesting and dovetails nicely with Augustine (he wrote more than just about predestination).

The divine nature is non-bodily. What is the mode of a non-bodily existence? It is easy to attack things as "Platonic," but is much more difficult to give answers to the above question without sounding Platonic.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Focusing on other aspects of the Great Tradition, but a few words on simplicity:

1) The Confessions affirm it.
2) The Thomist formulation needs a good response to the modal collapse.
3) It is not immediately clear how Thomist the Confessional view is.

The Platonic angle is very interesting and dovetails nicely with Augustine (he wrote more than just about predestination).

The divine nature is non-bodily. What is the mode of a non-bodily existence? It is easy to attack things as "Platonic," but is much more difficult to give answers to the above question without sounding Platonic.

I agree with this entirely. I also agree we may not be able to escape sounding Platonic. But whether that does commit us to Platonic/realist entities is another question. Quine will say that we are committed to such entities according to the principle of ontological commitment. Fictionalism/figuralism/neo-Meinongianism/many other options say that we aren't. If you haven't read Craig's God Over All I really think you should. I disagree with Craig on many things, but I think he's pretty much spot on in denying that we are committed to abstract objects.

To clarify my own view on simplicity, I believe, trivially, that God is metaphysically simple because I am not committed to the existence of abstract entities which stand outside of God and which God instantiates (which of course requires DDS to uphold aseity). But that's very different from traditional DDS, particularly as articulated by Aquinas.

I am also not coming at this question from the same perspective as someone like James White (though I think many of the criticisms against him are over the top and unwarranted). Here's one key difference - I still love Thomas Aquinas. He clearly has a vendetta against him.

 

[Ploutos]

Okay, so what I should be saying to my friend when he says 'I have a wife Elizabeth, she is really nice' is the following:

'I've never met Elizabeth, so I don't know what you mean'.

I wonder how my friend would react to that. But clearly, we both know that isn't how language works. Of course I know what he means, and I don't have to have met her to know what he means.

This is why I said reductionism. You're doing the either-or thing again, where it's either apophaticism or univocity. It's a nice rhetorical trick, but it's poor reasoning.

What you should be saying is: "Oh she's nice? Tell me more / What makes her nice / etc." That's what I'm getting at. There's a middle ground between "I know exactly what he said" and "I don't understand anything". Language does NOT reduce to univocity or apophaticism.

 

[Ulster Fry]

This is why I said reductionism. You're doing the either-or thing again, where it's either apophaticism or univocity. It's a nice rhetorical trick, but it's poor reasoning.

What you should be saying is: "Oh she's nice? Tell me more / What makes her nice / etc." That's what I'm getting at. There's a middle ground between "I know exactly what he said" and "I don't understand anything". Language does NOT reduce to univocity or apophaticism.

It's not a rhetorical trick, it's literally called the law of excluded middle in logic. Please look it up.

On our specific example, do I understand what he means when he tells me his wife is nice, who I have never met, or do I not? I'm not asking whether I might later find out that he's lying, that he was wrong, etc. I am asking, when he tells me his wife is nice, who I have never met, do I understand what he means? That is a yes or no question. Politicians might not follow the law of excluded middle, but we probably should.

 

[Ploutos]

It's not a rhetorical trick, it's literally called the law of excluded middle in logic. Please look it up.

On our specific example, do I understand what he means when he tells me his wife is nice, who I have never met, or do I not? I'm not asking whether I might later find out that he's lying, that he was wrong, etc. I am asking, when he tells me his wife is nice, who I have never met, do I understand what he means? That is a yes or no question. Politicians might not follow the law of excluded middle, but we probably should.

It's not a yes or no question. What does he mean by nice? What do you mean by nice?

 

[RamistThomist]

I am also not coming at this question from the same perspective as someone like James White (though I think many of the criticisms against him are over the top and unwarranted). Here's one key difference - I still love Thomas Aquinas. He clearly has a vendetta against him.

Right. I think many of us would have cut White some slack had he simultaneously not espoused something like Kenoticism and not attacked inseparable operations.

 

[Ulster Fry]

It's not a yes or no question. What does he mean by nice? What do you mean by nice?

Now we are just playing games, and in reality you would not really ask your friend, if he told you that his spouse was nice, to define his terms as you don't understand what he means. You know exactly what he intends by the statement.

I will say this one last thing. You stated:

'If you say that you know exactly what someone means, then you claim to know everything that they know, or everything that there is to know about the topic.'

This criterion for understanding what someone means is clearly untenable. I cannot know exactly what someone means unless I know everything that they know. It should also be obvious why this is a problem theologically. By your criterion of meaning, it is impossible to know exactly what God intends to say/means, because we will never know everything He knows, or everything there is to know about any topic that He knows. Because your standard for understanding what someone means is total knowledge.

Take any biblical statement, particularly those relevant to salvation, and now we have a real problem on our hands. I will never fully grasp the meaning because I fail to meet your set out criteria. But I believe that God does intend these things to be clear to us finite creatures.

 

[Ploutos]

Now we are just playing games, and in reality you would not really ask your friend, if he told you that his spouse was nice, to define his terms as you don't understand what he means. You know exactly what he intends by the statement.

I will say this one last thing. You stated:

'If you say that you know exactly what someone means, then you claim to know everything that they know, or everything that there is to know about the topic.'

This criterion for understanding what someone means is clearly untenable. I cannot know exactly what someone means unless I know everything that they know. It should also be obvious why this is a problem theologically. By your criterion of meaning, it is impossible to know exactly what God intends to say/means, because we will never know everything He knows, or everything there is to know about any topic that He knows. Because your standard for understanding what someone means is total knowledge.

Take any biblical statement, particularly those relevant to salvation, and now we have a real problem on our hands. I will never fully grasp the meaning because I fail to meet your set out criteria. But I believe that God does intend these things to be clear to us finite creatures.

You are correct. I would not approach a conversation with my friend as if it was an exercise in logic. But I could easily foresee saying "tell me more" which is a totally reasonable and socially acceptable course of action, and I note that you brushed past that part of my statement. The social function of such an approach is to acknowledge the limitations of one's knowledge coupled with a socially meaningful interest and curiosity generating a desire to expand said knowledge.

Something can be clear to us insofar as we understand it, even when we don't fully grasp the meaning. This is the definition of analogical. Likewise with the hypothetical husband of Elizabeth, certain things can be reasonably inferred from the statement about her niceness. It can be reasonably inferred that he finds her behaviors pleasing to him and it can be guessed that she has a personality that a broad consensus of people would find agreeable. But these are reasonable inferences - the type of reasonable inferences on which much of language and social interaction is based. They provide some information but they don't provide exact knowledge. Maybe Elizabeth is domineering and worships punctuality and he appreciates this about her, feeling loved and cared for by the way in which she keeps him on track. Maybe he's a craven thin-skinned coward and she unquestioningly provides him all the affirmation and ego-stroking he could ever want. Maybe he's just kind of a normal guy and she has an affable personality, a ready smile, and a kind word always at her lips. We can't know this without further exploration, so while we can claim some knowledge based on the statement "she is nice" we can't claim to know exactly what he means without further data.

Your last paragraph - and by the way, this is the third time I am pointing out this - is another either-or exercise. You will never fully grasp the meaning of much that has to do with God and your salvation. And yes, God intends these things to be clear to us finite creatures.

 

[Ulster Fry]

You will never fully grasp the meaning of much that has to do with God and your salvation.

Unnecessary and rather snide comment.

 

[Ploutos]

Unnecessary and rather snide comment.

How so? None of us will grasp the meaning of much that has to do with God and our salvation. That part is true of everybody. The part about incessant either-or reductionism - that part is specifically directed at you. But that's not the part you quoted.

 

[Ulster Fry]

How so? None of us will grasp the meaning of much that has to do with God and our salvation. That part is true of everybody. The part about incessant either-or reductionism - that part is specifically directed at you. But that's not the part you quoted.

I think I mistook it as a personal comment, but you're intending it as a universal statement. Fair enough and I apologise for the misunderstanding. However, I profoundly disagree. I think we can know exactly what God means when he says 'For Christ so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son...'. I just don't need to adopt your unrealistic criterion.

 

[Ploutos]

I think I mistook it as a personal comment, but you're intending it as a universal statement. Fair enough and I apologise for the misunderstanding. However, I profoundly disagree. I think we can know exactly what God means when he says 'For Christ so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son...'. I just don't need to adopt your unrealistic criterion.

Then you are saying that we can know things about God univocally.

I would say that we can know a good bit about what God means, and we can know it with unswerving certainty, as regards that statement. But to say that we can know exactly what God means by that? I disagree. And that's fine. We have different foundational premises going into this conversation, which I believe is something that has already been pointed out by others. Just please don't pull a reductio on a straw man version of my arguments. I'm not advocating apophaticism as an alternative. But by all means, feel free to believe that my framework for this is a bad one.

 

[shunoshimobe]

Right. I think many of us would have cut White some slack had he simultaneously not espoused something like Kenoticism

Where has he espoused such things?