I've been trying to figure out how to pose this issue and found the conclusion of PRRD 1 by Muller to be the best way to express it (pasted below).
We keep hearing about the "Great Tradition" as if there is a body of theology from Thomas or others that is universally acknowledged by all Christians. The problem I've noticed is that there is no definition of terms or an acknowledgment of how the theological method was eclectically used by the Protestant Scholastics. While I acknowledge that certain theological ideas were not really changed and carried over, it is important to note that the Protestant Scholastics developed theology in a decidedly different way than Medieval Scholasticism.
I think that to be theologically honest, charges that Churchmen are departing from orthodoxy ought to be centered less on whether they disagree with Aquinas or medieval theology as a whole or whether or not their theological method or conclusions cannot be found to correspond to any of the Reformed Orthodox streams of theological method and conclusions.
I would almost wish that there was some sort of fancy diagram that showed how various theological building blocks that included things like Thomas, Scotus, Ockham, Descartes, and others, were both leveraged and modified.
Right now, however, it seems that many who appeal to the "Great Tradition" are merely pointing to Thomas, and they seem completely unaware of post-Reformation orthodoxy itself. Isn't our "Great Tradition" distinctly Protestant?
We keep hearing about the "Great Tradition" as if there is a body of theology from Thomas or others that is universally acknowledged by all Christians. The problem I've noticed is that there is no definition of terms or an acknowledgment of how the theological method was eclectically used by the Protestant Scholastics. While I acknowledge that certain theological ideas were not really changed and carried over, it is important to note that the Protestant Scholastics developed theology in a decidedly different way than Medieval Scholasticism.
I think that to be theologically honest, charges that Churchmen are departing from orthodoxy ought to be centered less on whether they disagree with Aquinas or medieval theology as a whole or whether or not their theological method or conclusions cannot be found to correspond to any of the Reformed Orthodox streams of theological method and conclusions.
I would almost wish that there was some sort of fancy diagram that showed how various theological building blocks that included things like Thomas, Scotus, Ockham, Descartes, and others, were both leveraged and modified.
Right now, however, it seems that many who appeal to the "Great Tradition" are merely pointing to Thomas, and they seem completely unaware of post-Reformation orthodoxy itself. Isn't our "Great Tradition" distinctly Protestant?
9.4 Conclusions
With the conclusion of the discussion of the principia theologiae, we come not only to the end of the orthodox prolegomena but to the point at which we can survey the principles and presuppositions of Reformed orthodox system and make some judgments concerning the character of Protestant scholasticism. Of course, we are not in a position to make claims concerning the entire structure and organization of all orthodox systems, although some general remarks are surely in order on the basis of the intentions and methods argued in the prolegomena. Nor are we in a position to assess the contents of individual loci in the system beyond the prolegomena. Such issues await the concluding sections of subsequent parts of this study. Instead, we can assess the way in which the prolegomena point toward the system and define its method, its contents, and the relationships between its loci. We are entitled to assume that the prolegomena are genuine and that what they indicate to be the chief concerns of system are indeed the basic issues, principles, and structures of the system in all of its loci.
As argued in the introduction and illustrated by the discussions of natural theology, of the use of reason and philosophy, and of the principium cognoscendi theologiae, the Reformed orthodox system was hardly rationalistic, nor was it metaphysically inclined in any strict sense of the term. There are, of course, nominally meta-physical issues that belong to theology, given its proper object, God. And there are also significant relationships between the doctrine of God and the philosophical models used by theologians. Nonetheless, the rules of theological discourse set forth in the Reformed orthodox prolegomena carefully define and restrict the place of reason and philosophy to the end that the rational metaphysics of the day did not dictate the content of the doctrine. The large majority of the Reformed orthodox held to a version of the highly modified Christian Aristotelianism inherited from the medieval doctors and subjected to further modification and critique during the Renaissance and Reformation. We have noted the modifications brought about by medieval adjustment of Aristotelianism to various Platonic themes found in the fathers and to Augustinian models, by developments in Renaissance logic and rhetoric, notably through the work of Agricola and Ramus, and by the resurgence of interest in a variety of other ancient philosophies during the Renaissance. What is more, the critical but highly positive relationship to a Christian Aristotelianism provided by Aquinas and other exponents of the medieval via antiqua was also modified by Scotist and nominalist critiques that played over into the Reformation in several of its most significant teachers and which were mediated to their successors, the Protestant orthodox. The result was a highly eclectic appropriation of philosophy accompanied by a restriction of its positive use in theology. By way of example, the standard characterizations of the genus of theology as scientia or sapientia by the Reformed orthodox do not fit into a strictly Aristotelian pattern of definition.
In addition, the scholastic view of the object of theology—God as revealed, the primary object; and all the works of God, the secondary object—together with the locus method of exposition by topic, the scholastic approach to the division and definition of topics, and the discussion of Scripture as principium cognoscendi, points toward a concern for elaborating each and every topic of Christian theology on its own terms. Apart from the doctrines of Scripture and God, the orthodox system allows no principia or monistic organizing principles. Combined with the locus method, according to which the topics of theology were drawn out of an exegetical and traditionary exercise and then arranged in a suitable pattern or methodus, this understanding of principia stood in the way of any single philosophical principle or any individual theological doctrine becoming the unifying principle of the Reformed orthodox theology.
Beyond these largely negative conclusions that define the phenomenon of Protestant scholasticism over against several erroneous but, unfortunately, frequently reiterated characterizations, we can also provide a positive description of the Protestant scholastic system, both in terms of its development and in terms of its final form. In its method, the Protestant scholastic system depended upon the traditional scholastic pattern of the establishment of topics by careful division of the subject, the definition of topics through disputation with adversaries—the quaestio—and, finally, the elaboration of conclusions through the use of logical and rhetorical tools. This concentration on the parts of the whole, together with the organization of system by loci militated against the establishment of synthetic unity and aided the development of a system characterized by exhaustive, comprehensive treatment of all topics and by analytic rigor.
For overarching organization of system, the Reformed orthodox relied on teleological and historical issues. Typically, they move from the statement of principia, through creation, fall, and redemption, to the last things with an emphasis on the covenant as the historical or economical form of the divine work of salvation. Apart from this patterning, however, we find virtually no interest in deducing one doctrine from another but, instead, a desire to place exegetically established doctrinal loci at their proper points along the historical-teleological line of the system. In each locus, moreover, we can expect the methodological and epistemological definitions of theologia nostra, its limits, its genus, its object, the extent of its use of philosophy and reason, to establish the boundaries of argument, just as the principia, Scripture and God, limit and define what can be known and said about each aspect of the divine work.
These stylistic, methodological and architectonic interests of the Protestant orthodox did, of course, mark a major alteration of attitude and approach from the systematic essays of the first and second generation Reformers. In its fully scholastic and disputative forms, theology is now seldom discursive, and the catechetical models of the sixteenth century have been superceded by the more synthetic or a priori model of scholastic system. The style of the scholastic systems is propositional and the argumentation is rigorous. Where Calvin and his contemporaries had been content with more discursive forms and, as often noted, with the more rhetorical enthymeme, the orthodox tend to state their premises precisely and, when argument and conclusions are called for, in full syllogistic form. If the systems are not rationalist in their presuppositions, they are rational in form and in argument.
It is important, however, to note two qualifications of this stylistic point. First, the neat distinction that is sometimes posed between a Reformation-era humanistic model that argues in the form of enthymemes and a seventeenth-century scholastic approach that uses syllogisms cannot be sustained.162 In the first place, the enthymeme, albeit more suitable for high rhetoric than a full syllogism, is in fact a form of the syllogism, must be constructed properly, and—if stated poorly—can be just as fatal to a rhetorical argument as a defective syllogism would be to a demonstrative argument. It is also the case that humanist rhetorical manuals consistently discuss the enthymeme as a subcategory of the syllogism—the humanists did not ignore syllogisms! And, in addition, since the choice of an enthymeme over a syllogism, or vice versa, is quite genre specific, the one belonging to rhetorical persuasion, the other to logical demonstration, sixteenth and seventeenth-century authors would not gravitate definitively toward the one or the other but rather choose the syllogism for strictly “scholastic,” i.e., academic and demonstrative use and the enthymeme for use in oratory.163 Second, given the relationship between these logical forms and the genres of theological exposition, the contrast between the rhetorical discourse of the Reformers and the scholastic disputations of the Reformed orthodox is limited to the contrast between the doctrinal works of the Reformers taken in general and the full scholastic systems of the orthodox as a particular form of exposition. As noted previously, not all the writings of the Reformed orthodox take the scholastic approach.
Beyond this, it is also fairly clear from the prolegomena that the Reformed orthodox system is primarily a soteriological system, rather than a speculative, philosophical or metaphysical one. We recognize this: (1) from the definition of our theology as a theology in via, searching out its salvation between fall and eschaton; (2) from the limits placed on natural theology; (3) from the redefinition of a natural theology of the regenerate as belonging to Christian praise rather than to “fundamental theology,” as it were; (4) from the emphasis on the object of theology as God revealed and covenanted in Christ; and (5) from the stress upon the character of theology as theoretical-practical with the emphasis upon praxis. A system with presuppositions such as these would only with great difficulty enter the realm of speculative rationalism and, then, only to its ultimate destruction. The tendency of these presuppositions, spelled out in the system as a whole, was toward the establishment of a system scholastic in form and method but essentially in continuity with the teachings of the Reformers.
In his study of “Dogma in Protestant Scholasticism,” R. S. Franks argued cogently that “in systematizing and working out the practical doctrines of the Reformation, the seventeenth-century Scholasticism … preserved faithfully the central affirmations of the reformers.”164 Franks argues continuity with the theology of the Reformation on the issues of grace, faith, justification, and church and legitimate development from the Reformers’ pronouncement of sola Scriptura to the orthodox theologians’ doctrine of Scripture. His perspective on the Protestant scholastic use of philosophy is also worthy of note:
The philosophical element in the new Scholasticism, viz. the doctrines of God and the world, was practically taken over bodily from mediaevalism, and in reality presents no new growth when compared with its predecessor. The bold speculative outlook of the Middle Ages is lost. There is no longer the same independent interest in the philosophical problems of epistemology and metaphysics in their religious application. We have instead merely a statement of what may be called in modern phrase “the approved results” of the earlier scholastic investigations.165
Our examination of the Reformed orthodox prolegomena has substantiated the main points of Franks’ perspective and, in addition, permits some refinement of his generalization concerning the Protestant use of medieval scholastic philosophy. While it is quite correct that the Protestant orthodox borrow from the medieval scholastics and manifest little or no “independent interest in the philosophical problems of epistemology and metaphysics” in their relation to theology, it is also quite clear that the borrowing was hardly uncritical and, in addition, that the borrowing belonged to a larger framework of late Renaissance use and reappraisal of traditional philosophy, logic, and rhetoric. The Protestant scholastics were not “boldly speculative” in these areas because they had learned well at the hands of the Reformers—their borrowings reflect a wariness of excessive rationalism and excessive speculation. Indeed, the several places where we have noted a strong kinship between the Protestant scholastic and medieval scholastic systems, the Protestants seem to be treading a carefully marked path of Augustinianism and modified forms of Thomism and Scotism.
In brief, we found some genuine kinship with Henry of Ghent on the issue of causes of theology, with Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini together with Henry of Ghent on the object of theology, with Thomas of Strasbourg on the speculative-practical balance of theology, and with Duns Scotus on the overarching issue of the relationship of God’s self-knowledge (archetypal theology) to our theology. Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome represent a cautiously modified Thomism inasmuch as they attempt to synthesize the tradition of Augustinian theology with Aristotelian philosophy but attend closely to the dangers of such a synthesis. Giles, together with Gregory of Rimini and Thomas of Strasbourg, represents the Augustinianism of the Order of Saint Augustine, a branch of which would produce Staupitz and Luther and, later on, Peter Martyr Vermigli and Jerome Zanchi. Scotus’ perspective on theology, moreover, represents an Augustinian vision of divine transcendence in union with a critical perspective on the limits of human reason over against the more optimistic synthesis proposed by Thomas Aquinas. In each case, the Reformed scholastics seek out a position more critical of the powers of human reason and more traditionally Augustinian than that of Aquinas, without, however, moving over into a fully nominalistic perspective. The scholasticism they chose, as the “approved results” of earlier investigations was the scholasticism most attuned to the theology of the Reformers.
Beyond this critical appropriation, moreover, there are two other issues that modify Franks’ conclusion. On the one hand, there was an increasing encounter of the Protestant orthodox with the new philosophical movements of the seventeenth century. The critical reappropriation, via late the Renaissance recovery and reassessment of classical and medieval models, also involved reaction to, limited appropriation of, and adaptation of arguments from contemporary philosophy, including the thought of Zabarella, Suarez, and, in the course of the seventeenth century Descartes and various Cartesians. On the other hand, underlying the issues of the late Renaissance recovery and reappraisal of past philosophies, of Protestant orthodox reception of these late Renaissance efforts, and of the significant changes in style, method, and use of languages on the part of the renewed “scholasticism” of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were the fundamental ties between the developing Protestant theology and humanism. Seventeenth-century scholasticism itself was in part a product of Renaissance humanism, just as, more broadly, the academic ethos and setting of the seventeenth-century academy and university was a product of Renaissance and Reformation-era models.
In effect, the process of development that we have just traced in the prolegomena represents the attempt of succeeding generations of Protestants to come to terms with the establishment of the great sixteenth-century protest as a church in its own right and with the need of that new ecclesiastical establishment to be orthodox and, indeed, “catholic” in the broadest sense of the term. The establishment of orthodoxy or “right teaching” through scholastic method and the establishment of ties to the tradition through recourse to patristic and medieval sources manifest a successful process of institutionalization and catholicization. To fault the Protestant scholastics for producing an all-encompassing dogmatic system of right teaching and thereby “domesticating” the dynamic theology of the Reformation is, in fact, to fault Protestantism for its success in surviving as a church. Protestant orthodox theology is different from the theology of the Reformation—more so in form than in substance—but it is this very difference that marks its historical and doctrinal importance in the life of the Protestant churches.
162 Contra the point made in Quirinus Breen, “John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition,” in Christianity and Humanism, pp. 111, 122–24 and duplicated in McGrath, “Reformation to Enlightenment,” pp. 126–127.
163 See the more extended discussion of this issue in Muller, Unaccommodated Calvin, pp. 110–111.
164 R. S. Franks, “Dogma in Protestant Scholasticism,” in Dogma in History and Thought (London: Nisbet, 1929), p. 117.
165 Franks, “Dogma in Protestant Scholasticism,” p. 115.
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