armourbearer said:
Usually the phrase "all truth is God's truth" or "all truth is of God" relates to the fact that believers do not have a monopoloy on the truth but that it may be known and taught by unbelievers also, at least on an empirical level. If anything this is working against the kind of assumption made by creation-scientists, especially since the phrase directly refers to natural and moral truths.
I did not know that is what the phrase referred to. Very helpful! I had simply taken the phrase to mean that truth cannot contradict itself regardless of how it is derived.
armourbearer said:
Why are you not sure of the relationship of empirical facts to truth? Isn't it enough to say that the facts are true in an empirical sense, which has its use for the here and now?
The part that confuses me is what "true in an empirical sense" means. I can see the use for the here and now. I can also understand that "true in an empirical sense" means facts derived in an empirical manner. But when one speaks of a fact (e.g., Does an electron exist in reality? Does the earth go around the sun? Is this rock X years old? Do objects obey Newton's laws? Are the stars small or are they distant?), it seems to me it is either (a) true (or approximately true), and so corresponds to reality, (b) false, and so does not correspond to reality, or (c) something that does not have a truth value, in which case, how can it be called a fact? I suppose there is also (d) "provisionally true," which means hold the fact to be true or approximately true until proven otherwise.
There are different, standard views of how unobservable empirical facts relate to reality (it is agreed by most that observables directly or approximately correspond to reality). Realists say they directly or approximately correspond to reality. Instrumentalists say they do not necessarily correspond to reality in an ontological manner, but they do correspond in a functional manner (i.e., they allow us to make predictions) and that's all we can know.
When saying something is "true in an empirical sense," it seems like the presupposed view is somewhere between realists and instrumentalists (except applied to both observables and unobservables), but I'm not exactly sure where. On the one hand, we want to say our senses give us knowledge and our reasoning abilities are functional. But on the other hand, "empirical facts" are being treated as less than actually true (or approximately true) because of the facts being probabilistic and open to change. If they are less than actually true (or approximately true), then they cannot be bringing knowledge, which calls into question our sensory and reasoning abilities.
The best I can do to make sense of "true in an empirical sense" is to take an instrumentalist view of the matter that nevertheless acknowledges that our models do describe reality, although there may be another, equally valid way to describe reality (by connecting it to reality in this manner, it seems to me this view can handle the standard realist objection of how models can make successful predictions if what they describe in ontology and equations do not exist in reality). Yet, in our conversations, it sometimes seems like you take empirical facts as being more than just models (and with good reason I think, because if induction cannot bring knowledge, then we know basically nothing and are reduced to opinions), and then I get confused again about how empirical facts relate to truth.
I hope that helps clarify. I'll give it another go at explanation if it does not.
Edit: Perhaps a more succinct way of explaining where I am stuck is that either something is "true in an empirical sense," i.e., aligns with the data, experiment, and critical observations, or it does not. If it does not, then it is false, i.e., does not correspond with reality. If it does, then either it directly or approximately corresponds with reality or it does not. If it does, then it has the qualities of truth, and so however else facts of Scripture and empirical facts differ, they both are equal in having the qualities of truth, and so the objection from the Creation scientist (or OEC or TE, I suppose) stands. However, this seems to make empirical facts too absolute and universal, which is a problem since they are probabilistic, open to change, relative to other empirical facts, and seen from our finite point of view.
So suppose they do not directly or approximately correspond with reality. Then it seems we cannot trust our sensory and reasoning abilities to arrive at knowledge of objects (e.g., whether objects exist) by the scientific method. Furthermore, the reasoning of empirical science (from hypothesis to testing hypothesis) is used in everyday life, so everything we know by induction or abduction (such as that our mother is our mother) is only opinion, not knowledge. This conclusion is problematic because we should be able to trust our senses and reasoning ability to some degree because of basic beliefs. Gordon Clark might say that this skeptical conclusion only applies to empirical science because the aim of science is too precise and indirect for it to be strictly true, but it seems to me this doesn't address the reasons I discussed in this paragraph that the skeptical conclusion would apply everywhere.