Charles Johnson
Puritan Board Junior
As promised in our thread on Vos, the following are my thoughts on why Vos's Reformed Dogmatics is just ok:
Firstly, the good:
Vos is generally, although not universally, in line with the Reformed Confessions, and he isn't a liberal (i.e. he believes in the inspiration and authority of Scripture, the virgin birth and resurrection, etc).
Moreover, Vos gives an expression of Reformed Dogmatics that is probably similar in quality to other writers of the late 19th century and onward (Bavinck, Berkhoff, Dabney, etc).
Now, what I don't think is great in the book:
1) First off, at times the translation leaves something to be desired.
Take, for example, the description of God's simplicity on p. 19. In translation, it reads "God is free... of supernatural composition; in Him there is no distinction between slumbering capacity and action."
It was immediately clear to me as a reader of the Reformed Orthodox (and a comparison of the Dutch confirmed this) that this section was supposed to read "God is free of metaphysical composition; in Him there is no distinction between passive potency and act."
The declaration that God is actus purus and is metaphysically simple is a standard part of the doctrine of God from at least Aquinas on to Turretin, so it's very strange that the translators could translate this in such a clumsy way.
2) On divine simplicity, Vos is deficient. First he affirms divine simplicity (p. 19), but then he states that God's attributes are not identical in substance (p. 27, "Is God's knowledge the same as his power", p. 31, "Can we say that God's will and understanding are the same;" p. 37, "what distinguishes God's love from his holiness"). Moreover, he admits that he is at variance from Augustine, Aquinas, and "many Reformed and Lutheran theologians" (i.e. all the Reformed Orthodox).
But Vos appears not to understand that the attributes can be distinguished with a rational distinction, insofar as we understand something different by them, without placing divisions in the divine essence. Moreover, his objections to these attributes being one in substance are objections that are plainly addressed in the Reformed Orthodox, like that "their objects are different."
3) Vos appears to understand the Trinity as three centers of consciousness. He says, "within God's being itself there is a distinction that should explain completely how there can be consciousness of personal existence in God apart from other things. The Father is indeed conscious not to be the Son, and the Son not to be the Father, and the Holy Spirit not to be the Father and not to be the Son." (p. 26)
Now, maybe he does not mean to define the three persons as three centers of consciousness by this, but like many things he states, there is a fair amount of ambiguity in his words.
4) Vos appears to think that there is an irresolveable contradiction between God's decreeing / permitting sin in the decretive will and his forbidding of it in the preceptive will (p. 33-34). He says, "Can we sufficiently solve the difficulty here for our thinking? No."
He also surveys the manner in which the difficulty is resolved in the Reformed Orthodox (p. 33, #73), but he appears to miss that, for all of the Reformed Orthodox, not to mention Augustine and other fathers, sin is merely the privation of good, rather than a real entity, and God is only the efficient cause of what really exists. He is not the cause or author of sin. God in creation made all things good (Gen. 1). This difficulty is, in my opinion, resolved in a satisfactory manner in Polanus, Turretin, Van Mastricht, etc, and Vos, instead of learning from them, prefers to assert that there is an irresolveable contradiction at the heart of our theology. That's a gift to our opponents, especially arminians, who contend that our doctrine of the divine decree is absurd, and it's easy to see Vos as the fount of the doctrine of true paradoxes that has come to such prominence in the work of Van Til.
5) Vos appears to be mistaken about the distinction between an antecedent and consequent will in God. As Turretin explains, when the Reformed Orthodox (i.e. Polanus; he's the principal one that does this) talk about an antecedent and consequent will, those terms are synonymous with preceptive will and decretive will, respectively. But Vos thinks the terms refer to decreeing something that comes first and something else that follows.
"God wills A with an antecedent will and is not then forced to choose B with a consequent will, but omnipotently makes B an effective means for reaching A." (p. 32)
This is a really puzzling one because of all the Reformed schools of the 17th century (the hypothetical universalism of Amyraut, Cameron, Davenant; the limited atonement of Owen, Turretin, Rutherford; the antecedent-consequent distinction in Polanus) none of them understood the distinction in a way similar to what Vos describes here. He's just sorely mistaken.
6) Vos appears to oppose the doctrine of active obedience ("Q. 23. Is it correct to say that the righteousness of the Mediator is imputed to us in justification and infused in sanctification?
…it is not the same righteousness of Christ that occurs in its two parts. When I speak of an imputed righteousness of the Mediator, then I mean that righteousness that He obtained by means of his suffering and dying and obedience in the state of humiliation–not, however, the righteousness of life of the human nature of Christ, that is, that Christ in his human nature now possesses. The latter is not imputed to me. And, conversely, the former cannot be infused into me; it can only be reckoned to me. Really, one cannot even say that the righteousness in which Christ now lives is infused into me. This always rests on a more or less unclear mystical conception. It is not the personal righteousness of Christ that is infused into the believer, for, as an inherent quality, righteousness cannot be detached from the person.” p. 801)
Now, admittedly, I haven't read the whole book; these errors were enough for me to feel that my time would be better spent in the Reformed Orthodox, and so I left off after 50 pages. Especially as far as the doctrine of God is concerned, I would refer readers to Augustine, Novatian, Turretin, Ames, Leigh, Ussher, Charnock, Polanus, Van Mastricht, Cheynell, Zanchi, the Leiden Synopsis, and any number of other historic writers before Vos.
Firstly, the good:
Vos is generally, although not universally, in line with the Reformed Confessions, and he isn't a liberal (i.e. he believes in the inspiration and authority of Scripture, the virgin birth and resurrection, etc).
Moreover, Vos gives an expression of Reformed Dogmatics that is probably similar in quality to other writers of the late 19th century and onward (Bavinck, Berkhoff, Dabney, etc).
Now, what I don't think is great in the book:
1) First off, at times the translation leaves something to be desired.
Take, for example, the description of God's simplicity on p. 19. In translation, it reads "God is free... of supernatural composition; in Him there is no distinction between slumbering capacity and action."
It was immediately clear to me as a reader of the Reformed Orthodox (and a comparison of the Dutch confirmed this) that this section was supposed to read "God is free of metaphysical composition; in Him there is no distinction between passive potency and act."
The declaration that God is actus purus and is metaphysically simple is a standard part of the doctrine of God from at least Aquinas on to Turretin, so it's very strange that the translators could translate this in such a clumsy way.
2) On divine simplicity, Vos is deficient. First he affirms divine simplicity (p. 19), but then he states that God's attributes are not identical in substance (p. 27, "Is God's knowledge the same as his power", p. 31, "Can we say that God's will and understanding are the same;" p. 37, "what distinguishes God's love from his holiness"). Moreover, he admits that he is at variance from Augustine, Aquinas, and "many Reformed and Lutheran theologians" (i.e. all the Reformed Orthodox).
But Vos appears not to understand that the attributes can be distinguished with a rational distinction, insofar as we understand something different by them, without placing divisions in the divine essence. Moreover, his objections to these attributes being one in substance are objections that are plainly addressed in the Reformed Orthodox, like that "their objects are different."
3) Vos appears to understand the Trinity as three centers of consciousness. He says, "within God's being itself there is a distinction that should explain completely how there can be consciousness of personal existence in God apart from other things. The Father is indeed conscious not to be the Son, and the Son not to be the Father, and the Holy Spirit not to be the Father and not to be the Son." (p. 26)
Now, maybe he does not mean to define the three persons as three centers of consciousness by this, but like many things he states, there is a fair amount of ambiguity in his words.
4) Vos appears to think that there is an irresolveable contradiction between God's decreeing / permitting sin in the decretive will and his forbidding of it in the preceptive will (p. 33-34). He says, "Can we sufficiently solve the difficulty here for our thinking? No."
He also surveys the manner in which the difficulty is resolved in the Reformed Orthodox (p. 33, #73), but he appears to miss that, for all of the Reformed Orthodox, not to mention Augustine and other fathers, sin is merely the privation of good, rather than a real entity, and God is only the efficient cause of what really exists. He is not the cause or author of sin. God in creation made all things good (Gen. 1). This difficulty is, in my opinion, resolved in a satisfactory manner in Polanus, Turretin, Van Mastricht, etc, and Vos, instead of learning from them, prefers to assert that there is an irresolveable contradiction at the heart of our theology. That's a gift to our opponents, especially arminians, who contend that our doctrine of the divine decree is absurd, and it's easy to see Vos as the fount of the doctrine of true paradoxes that has come to such prominence in the work of Van Til.
5) Vos appears to be mistaken about the distinction between an antecedent and consequent will in God. As Turretin explains, when the Reformed Orthodox (i.e. Polanus; he's the principal one that does this) talk about an antecedent and consequent will, those terms are synonymous with preceptive will and decretive will, respectively. But Vos thinks the terms refer to decreeing something that comes first and something else that follows.
"God wills A with an antecedent will and is not then forced to choose B with a consequent will, but omnipotently makes B an effective means for reaching A." (p. 32)
This is a really puzzling one because of all the Reformed schools of the 17th century (the hypothetical universalism of Amyraut, Cameron, Davenant; the limited atonement of Owen, Turretin, Rutherford; the antecedent-consequent distinction in Polanus) none of them understood the distinction in a way similar to what Vos describes here. He's just sorely mistaken.
6) Vos appears to oppose the doctrine of active obedience ("Q. 23. Is it correct to say that the righteousness of the Mediator is imputed to us in justification and infused in sanctification?
…it is not the same righteousness of Christ that occurs in its two parts. When I speak of an imputed righteousness of the Mediator, then I mean that righteousness that He obtained by means of his suffering and dying and obedience in the state of humiliation–not, however, the righteousness of life of the human nature of Christ, that is, that Christ in his human nature now possesses. The latter is not imputed to me. And, conversely, the former cannot be infused into me; it can only be reckoned to me. Really, one cannot even say that the righteousness in which Christ now lives is infused into me. This always rests on a more or less unclear mystical conception. It is not the personal righteousness of Christ that is infused into the believer, for, as an inherent quality, righteousness cannot be detached from the person.” p. 801)
Now, admittedly, I haven't read the whole book; these errors were enough for me to feel that my time would be better spent in the Reformed Orthodox, and so I left off after 50 pages. Especially as far as the doctrine of God is concerned, I would refer readers to Augustine, Novatian, Turretin, Ames, Leigh, Ussher, Charnock, Polanus, Van Mastricht, Cheynell, Zanchi, the Leiden Synopsis, and any number of other historic writers before Vos.
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