TryingToLearn
Puritan Board Freshman
I was reading Turretin on hypothetical universalism and I am confused on how one of his arguments is supposed to logically follow. Here's the section:
Nor would the nature of the thing
allow this [That it can be said at the same time that Christ died for some absolutely and for all conditionally] since (on their hypothesis) there was as yet no consideration of the elect in the decree concerning the death of Christ, according to which he died
(indeed with the same intention with which the decree was passed, since the execution must answer to the destination; nor could there be any other affection and intention in Christ dying than in the Father destining). They hold that the
elect were separated by a posterior decree from others. Again, who can believe that in the one most simple act by which God decreed all things (although we have to conceive of it by parts), there were two intentions so diverse (not to say contrary) that in one manner Christ should die for all and in another only for some? Nay, since Christ could not will to die absolutely for the elect without
involving (by the law of contraries) a will not to die for the reprobate, it cannot be conceived how in one act he should will both to die for the reprobate and not to die for them.
But should not the word "absolutely" be added in after "(by the law of contraries) a will not to die for the reprobate" in order for this argument to work? Yet it cannot be since the logic doesn't follow.
So from the hypothetical universalist view, the order of decrees is so:
1. Christ dies for all conditionally
2. Christ dies for the elect absolutely
2.1 (therefore, by the law of contraries, Christ does not die for the reprobate absolutely).
There is no contradiction here. But Turretin in order to make his argument wants the order to be saying:
1. Christ dies for all conditionally
2. Christ dies for the elect absolutely
2.1 (therefore, by the law of contraries, Christ does not die for the reprobate at all).
Am I missing something? Is there a way to fix this argument?
Nor would the nature of the thing
allow this [That it can be said at the same time that Christ died for some absolutely and for all conditionally] since (on their hypothesis) there was as yet no consideration of the elect in the decree concerning the death of Christ, according to which he died
(indeed with the same intention with which the decree was passed, since the execution must answer to the destination; nor could there be any other affection and intention in Christ dying than in the Father destining). They hold that the
elect were separated by a posterior decree from others. Again, who can believe that in the one most simple act by which God decreed all things (although we have to conceive of it by parts), there were two intentions so diverse (not to say contrary) that in one manner Christ should die for all and in another only for some? Nay, since Christ could not will to die absolutely for the elect without
involving (by the law of contraries) a will not to die for the reprobate, it cannot be conceived how in one act he should will both to die for the reprobate and not to die for them.
But should not the word "absolutely" be added in after "(by the law of contraries) a will not to die for the reprobate" in order for this argument to work? Yet it cannot be since the logic doesn't follow.
So from the hypothetical universalist view, the order of decrees is so:
1. Christ dies for all conditionally
2. Christ dies for the elect absolutely
2.1 (therefore, by the law of contraries, Christ does not die for the reprobate absolutely).
There is no contradiction here. But Turretin in order to make his argument wants the order to be saying:
1. Christ dies for all conditionally
2. Christ dies for the elect absolutely
2.1 (therefore, by the law of contraries, Christ does not die for the reprobate at all).
Am I missing something? Is there a way to fix this argument?