I guess I'm still confused how he could say "for we hold that not one or another kind of punishment is necessary, but that punishment itself is necessary". Is not the punishment of eternal death the necessary kind of punishment? And if "the punishment, according to the rule of God's wisdom and justice, is death", then it would seem that the punishment of death (a specific kind of punishment) is necessary (via the very justice of God). As he himself says "the punishment due to every sin, from his right and by the rule of his justice, is eternal; nor could the thing in itself be otherwise".
I'll disagree with some interpretations put forward here. I think Owen is in fact arguing that punishments other than eternal death are possible. But this is highly qualified and precise, as will be seen below.
Consider:
Page 612 near the bottom:
This learned author's third argument is taken from some absurd consequences, which he supposes to follow from our opinion; for he thus proceeds to reason:
"Those who teach that sin merits punishment from a necessity of the divine nature, without any intervention of a free decree, teach, at the same time, that God cannot forbid sin to man without necessarily forbidding it under the penalty of eternal death. As if, when God forbids adultery or theft, in a human court he forbids them with a modification of the punishment..."
Owen quotes Rutherford arguing in favor of the major premise contained in the underlined and italicized portions. "If you teach the necessity of sin's punishment without a free decree...then you also teach that God cannot forbid sin unless under the penalty of eternal death." This is the basis of Rutherford's critique, and it is, as Owen acknowledges, supposed "to follow from our opinion." So the "if" is Owen's position, and the "then" is Rutherford's attempt to show a false statement to which it leads. The rest of Rutherford's argument is intriguing. Essentially he is arguing that God forbids some sins by punishments other than eternal death. This minor premise contradicts the "then" of the if-then, and therefore the "if" (Owen's position) must be false.
Owen critiques this, affirming the "if" and rejecting the "then." Page 613:
In what sense sin deserves punishment from the necessity of the divine nature, we have already shown at large. Neither, however, do we think ourselves bound to teach that God could not forbid sin but under the penalty of eternal death; for we hold that not one or another kind of punishment is necessary, but that punishment itself is necessary, and the punishment, according to the rule of God's wisdom and justice, is death.
I underlined and italicized the same portions of Rutherford's major premise to show the connection. Owen criticizes it by demonstrating that Rutherford has made an unwarranted jump from the abstract to one particular. Owen says "punishment" is necessary, not "punishment by eternal death" is necessary. Rutherford has jumped from the necessity of "punishment" to the necessity of "punishment by eternal death" without justifying why the necessity of eternal death (remember: without a free decree) follows from only the necessity of punishment. In other words, to borrow from my mathematician language, Owen is distinguishing between the questions of existence and identity. That punishment exists is necessary. That punishment is specified as eternal death is necessary does not follow from the necessary existence of punishment. It would be like me arguing that in the equation 3x + 1 = 0 that because the solution "x" exists necessarily, then it follows that the value of x is 1 necessarily. However, I've made an unwarranted jump to a particular (and in this case, false) solution. That existence is necessary does not imply that a
particular value is necessary.
The reason Owen does this is actually to demonstrate that "eternal death" is in fact the only punishment
in God's court. You have to notice the contexts that Rutherford and Owen bring up in the discussion of punishments. Rutherford argues about punishments in two courts: human courts (appointed by God), and God's own court. If God can punish theft by less than death in a human court, it proves (to Rutherford) that he can punish theft by less than death in his own court. On the other hand, if the punishment follows from strict logical necessity, then it is impossible (to Rutherford) that God could declare different penalties for the same sin, because one of them would then be unjust.
So Owen is being extremely precise in the proposition that he is rejecting. It is not that he rejects "the punishment of sin is eternal death." He rejects "God could not forbid sin except under the penalty of eternal death," and he also rejects the major premise which contains it. The reason is because God
does forbid sins (in human courts) under penalties which are not eternal death, and Owen is upholding that liberty - the same liberty Rutherford argues on - while showing its compatibility with the punishment in God's court being only (and one could say, necessarily) eternal death.
This is shown by his response to Rutherford's argument near the bottom of page 613:
As to the establishment of punishment, then, in a human court, as it has not primarily and properly a respect to the punishment of transgression, nor a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God, but with respect to one another, that degree of punishment is just which is fit and proper for accomplishing the proposed end.
In other words: punishment is appointed to an end. In human courts, even established by God, the end of punishment is not the satisfaction of divine justice. And so therefore, though punishment is necessary, the punishment of eternal death is not, because human courts are not ordained to satisfy divine justice. And with this, Rutherford's third argument falls apart.
He then continues on page 614, clarifying even more:
nor, in respect of God, do we think any degree or mode of punishment necessary, but such as may answer the end of the punishment, so far as respects the state of the creatures with respect to God.
The preposition "but" there is extremely important. Again, Owen is being very precise in his propositions. No degree or mode of punishment (that is, no
particular specification of punishment) is necessary just because punishment in general is necessary. But some degree or mode
may become necessary depending on the end of the punishment. If one end has several options, no necessity is imposed (except restriction to those options). If a different end has only one option of punishment that answers it, then that particular punishment is necessary
in that case. And the purposes of God's appointed punishments in human courts are different than his purposes in the covenant of works.
Now consider on page 617:
We say that God hath revealed to us that the punishment due to every sin, from his right and by the rule of his justice, is eternal; nor could the thing in itself be otherwise, for the punishment of a finite and sinful creature could not otherwise make any compensation for the guilt of its sin.
The end in view here is once more very precise: to make compensation (or perhaps better, "satisfaction") to God for sin. To heal the offense against the divine nature which the sin caused.
This end demands eternal death as the exclusive degree and mode of punishment. The necessity follows not from the necessity of punishment itself, but from the purpose of this punishment. Your original quote omits the critical part of the sentence (we have a rule at my workplace: read
every word), which when placed beside the initial quote, which is again partial and missing the critical part of its sentence, creates the apparent contradiction.
