Clarkian Knowledge and Archetypal/Ectypal Theology

[Civbert]

I believe there is a personal element to all of knowledge, so that it is not ever to be restricted to propositions. ...

I agree there is a personal element to knowledge - but it does not follow that knowledge is anything more than propositional. Any non-propositional knowledge would be unknowable (at best) and utter nonsense (at worst).

Please tell me one non-propositional truth you know.

However, the reformed have denied the mystical idea of knowing God immediately.

Could you explain this? First, what do you mean by immediately, and second why is that mystical? Is not the knowledge of God, his character, not immediate knowledge.

JonhV mentioned the knowledge of interpreted dreams. This seems like immediate knowledge so maybe I don't understand what you mean by "immediate".

 

[JohnV]

Anthony:

It seems that you grasped my intention before I stated it, concerning the mediacy or immediacy of knowledge.

Where I would think that you may have misunderstood me is that at the same time my question is also a critique of the suggestion that knowledge is only propositional.

But I want to be sure to understand what you're saying. Therefore a question for you: by asserting that knowledge is only propositional, are you saying that knowledge is that which can be put into propositional form? Or are you saying that one cannot know a matter until it is in propositional form? Or are you suggesting something else, perhaps? Help me understand this.

For it seems to me that the TA/TE approach as some understand it is not that much different than the supposition that all knowledge is propositional. In other words, you can replace the term "TE" with the term "propositional" and have the same kind of structure. In such a case, then, the term "TA" would refer to God's pre-propositional knowledge, since God does not require a subject/predicate structure to His knowledge, but knows both so that they come into existence in relation to each other. If you can explain this for me, I would be grateful.

 

[MW]

Please tell me one non-propositional truth you know.

God, i.e., whom, not what.

Could you explain this? First, what do you mean by immediately, and second why is that mystical? Is not the knowledge of God, his character, not immediate knowledge.

Immediate in the context of AT and ET is without the mediation of human conceptions. Joseph and Daniel interpreted dreams by means of human conceptions.

 

[JohnV]

Maybe one more possibility, Anthony:

Do you perhaps mean that all truth is finally able to be put into propositional form, but that it is not necessarily first discerned propositionally? Or do you maybe separate proposition from verbalized form?

Help me understand this, please.

 

[Civbert]

... Therefore a question for you: by asserting that knowledge is only propositional, are you saying that knowledge is that which can be put into propositional form? Or are you saying that one cannot know a matter until it is in propositional form? Or are you suggesting something else, perhaps? Help me understand this.

I think the first - "knowledge is that which can be put into propositional form" - is best. But the second - "that one cannot know a matter until it is in propositional form" - is very close. I would say, that one can not be aware of knowing something if he has not consciously understood that thing in propositional form. It may be possible to know something, yet not be conscious of knowing it, but that knowledge would still be propositional.

The simplest definition of knowledge is "justified true belief". All would agree that when we know a thing this assumes we "believe" it is true. But we also believe our opinions are true. So it must be more than belief that defines knowledge. So we say it is must be justified true, not simply true. Now we might disagree on what "justifies", but it would be difficult to conceive of knowing if we it can not be considered as true or false.

Since we can not believe something is true unless it can be assigned a true/false values, then it must be capable of being formed into a meaningful statement. And all statements can be put into propositional form. And a proposition is a subject, copula, and a predicate (that conveys the meaning of a statement). This is essential for rational thought. Predication is necessary for us to say "this is true, and that is false, or "I just can not say either way".

By the way, I recommend Brian (the Brain's) article on traditional logic.

So what we can know must be able to be stated in the form of a proposition. If it can not be presented in such a form, it will be nonsense to us - and nonsense is not knowledge. Knowledge is necessarily propositional.

...
For it seems to me that the TA/TE approach as some understand it is not that much different than the supposition that all knowledge is propositional. In other words, you can replace the term "TE" with the term "propositional" and have the same kind of structure. In such a case, then, the term "TA" would refer to God's pre-propositional knowledge, since God does not require a subject/predicate structure to His knowledge, but knows both so that they come into existence in relation to each other. If you can explain this for me, I would be grateful.

Here is where I think the TA/TE model is speculative. Since we can not know a non-propositions (since a non-proposition has not true/false state) then if TA is non-propositional, it is not knowable - it is nonsensical. Then again, if the TA is merely God's complete set of thoughts (all true propositions), then TA/TE makes sense - and then TE is simply those propositions God has revealed to man.

While both predicate and subject are known to God together, it does not follow that God's knowledge is not propositional or structured into predicates and subjects. The essential concept of knowledge entails that it must be propositional or God does not "know" anything. Or if he does not know propositionally, then God's mind is nonsensical to mans. But we are made in God's image and God speaks to us. Scripture is God's mind revealed to man, and since the truths of scripture and all language are propositional, it seem prudent (at the very least) to suppose God's knowledge is itself propositional. Especially if we are going to believe we can know God's will through his revelation in Scripture.

 

[Civbert]

In answer to my request "Please tell me one non-propositional truth you know.":

God, i.e., whom, not what.

And who is God? Your response implies you can answer the question.

 

[JohnV]

Thanks for the response, Anthony. I'm going to think about that for a while.

I'm asking these questions and thinking about this in terms of the AT/ET model.

 

[MW]

In answer to my request "Please tell me one non-propositional truth you know.":

And who is God? Your response implies you can answer the question.

Actually, I'm not a dog and I don't chase my tail. Who is God? can only be answered in terms of relation, which itself is meaningful only in terms of experience. What is God? would require me to posit attributes, which would then suit your purpose.

Think about what the Proverbs say about an angry countenance or a soft answer, and the effects these modes of communication have on others. Think also about what it means to call Christ God's unspeakable gift, and to talk about joy unspeakable and full of glory. In these things our experience surpasses our ability to conceptualise. Yet we know these things. We know things which surpass knowledge. That is because God is greater than our hearts, and hence greater than our knowedge. The object known surpasses the subject knowing. Humans have always communicated with their young with non-propositional knowledge. That is why the Bible places as much importance on the manner in which we say things as on the matter which is spoken.

 

[Civbert]

Thanks for the response, Anthony. I'm going to think about that for a while.

I'm asking these questions and thinking about this in terms of the AT/ET model.

Your welcome. I'm sure my answers could have been clearer. For me, explaining why I believe knowledge is propositional is like trying to show why integral calculus works. I've seen the proofs and understood them and am convinced they are correct, but when I try to explain, my thoughts don't flow freely.

Have you even seen the graphical proof of the Pythagorean Theorem. When you see it, it's really simple. But to explain it... argh!

 

[R. Scott Clark]

According to Junius and most of Reformed theology following him, yes, there can be a finite, accommodated "copy" or analogy (better) of what God knows.

Is there an a priori reason why God cannot be said to ordained such?

The roots of the TA/TE distinction are much more ancient than Hume.

Why is relevant to this discussion?

Junius began using the terminology in 1590 in De vera theologia as Rev Winzer has mentioned several times.

rsc

FYI:


Thoughts. Is there such a thing as a "copy" of a proposition? That is, if you know P and I know P, do we know two different propositions? I guess that depends on your idea of what knowledge is.
....
Is Humes the first to use the concept of ectypal? It seems for Humes, the idea depends on his concept ontology which was empirical, no? His view was all knowledge was ectypal - you know not an object "in itself" (archetypal) but a reflection or image of the object (ectypal). This is a little different than what I've read about ET and AT, but it seems to be related.

Very interesting discussion so far.

 

[Civbert]

Actually, I'm not a dog and I don't chase my tail. Who is God? can only be answered in terms of relation, which itself is meaningful only in terms of experience. What is God? would require me to posit attributes, which would then suit your purpose.

"Who is God?" is only answered meaningfully with propositions:

(God) is infinite in being and perfection (Job_11:7-9, Job_26:14), a most pure spirit (Joh_4:24), invisible (1Ti_1:17), without body, parts (Deu_4:15, Deu_4:16; Luk_24:39; Joh_4:24), or passions (Act_14:11, Act_14:15), immutable (Mal_3:6; Jam_1:17), immense (1Ki_8:27; Jer_23:23, Jer_23:24), eternal (Psa_90:2; 1Ti_1:17), incomprehensible (Psa_145:3), almighty (Gen_17:1; Rev_4:8), most wise (Rom_16:27), most holy (Isa_6:3; Rev_4:8), most free (Psa_115:3), most absolute (Exo_3:14), working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and most righteous will (Eph_1:11), for His own glory (Pro_16:4; Rom_11:36); most loving (1Jo_4:8, 1Jo_4:16), gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin (Exo_34:6, Exo_34:7); the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him (Heb_11:6); and with all most just and terrible in His judgments (Neh_9:32, Neh_9:33), hating all sin (Psa_5:5, Psa_5:6), and ; who will by no means clear the guilty (Exo_34:7; Nah_1:2, Nah_1:3).
(WCF 2:1

God is almighty, omnipotent, perfect, eternal, the Creator, without end, our Father, Jesus, the Holy Spirit, love, merciful, gracious, just, etc. These are all propositions revealed to us in Scripture. Each is meaningful and knowable and thus the Scriptures answer the question - who is God - with propositions. The "relationship" we have with God is His speaking to us in meaningful knowable thinkable propositional truths.

Now you my object and say I answered "what" God is, and so I have. But if God is more than what the Scriptures say, then we do not know. If you want to know who God is, then we can say more is God is God - the propositional answer he gives us in Exodus 3:14.

So if one can not answer who God is with propositions, then one doesn't know who God is. But the answers are simple and given to us in written form. To know who God is - is to know his Word.

To know God, just read the book and believe.

No experience required.

 

[Civbert]

According to Junius and most of Reformed theology following him, yes, there can be a finite, accommodated "copy" or analogy (better) of what God knows.

Is there an a priori reason why God cannot be said to ordained such?

To reveal some of what he knows to us? He clearly has.

The roots of the TA/TE distinction are much more ancient than Hume.

Why is relevant to this discussion?

Junius began using the terminology in 1590 in De vera theologia as Rev Winzer has mentioned several times.

rsc[/QUOTE]

Humes was someone who I found that used the terms ectypal and archetypal - so I was wondering if he was a source of the concept. It is relevant because Humes used the terms in a similar fashion and I am trying to understand how the concepts were developed. I haven't found the terminology elsewhere (not that my resources are exhaustive despite the Internet and Google ).

I guess what I'm saying is that a copy of a proposition is the same things as the proposition. When you think of the number 7 and I think of the number 7, we are are both thinking the exact same 7 - not two different 7's. Seven does not mean 6 to you and 8 to me. And so if God knows p and he reveals p to me such that I know p, then we both know the same thing, regardless if God knows it eternally and I know it temporally, p is p. (the law of identity.)

 

[MW]

"Who is God?" is only answered meaningfully with propositions:

God is almighty, omnipotent, perfect, eternal, the Creator, without end, our Father, Jesus, the Holy Spirit, love, merciful, gracious, just, etc. These are all propositions revealed to us in Scripture. Each is meaningful and knowable and thus the Scriptures answer the question - who is God - with propositions. The "relationship" we have with God is His speaking to us in meaningful knowable thinkable propositional truths.

Perhaps you may want to look up Shorter Catechism, question 4, and Larger Catechism, question 7. The historical reason for the "what" instead of the "who" is the one I provided you.

To know God, just read the book and believe.

No experience required.

Now you are completely out of line with reformed thinking. Next you will be telling me that faith does not include trust.

 

[Civbert]

Now you are completely out of line with reformed thinking. Next you will be telling me that faith does not include trust.

Faith implies trust.

 

[MW]

Faith implies trust.

I'm not sure what the difference is between includes and implies; but supposing there is nothing inimical, would you be happy to say that knowledge implies experience? Then, on the basis that a good Clarkian would at least agree God's knowledge is quantitatively different from ours, would you agree that our implied experience of God must be quantitatively different from our knowledge of God, seeing the object of knowledge acts in a quantitatively greater manner than our knowledge can conceive Him?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Anthony,

You moved the thread into a different direction so I formed a new thread around Clark's thought.

Interesting to note that you're helping to distinguish Clarkianism from this historically Reformed formulation.

Rev Winzer: Is it fair to say that the WCF Divines carried forward the TA/TE and that Clark's thought is out of sync with the framers of the WCF as well?

 

[MW]

Rev Winzer: Is it fair to say that the WCF Divines carried forward the TA/TE and that Clark's thought is out of sync with the framers of the WCF as well?

Hi Rich. Clark's thought is constructed in terms of idealism, which the Westminster divines generally rejected. The Confession's position on the "marks" of Scripture and assurance of grace indicates their belief that knowledge was possible by means of information external to Scripture. There were some radicals at the Assembly who were Fifth Monarchy men and Cambridge Platonists. I hope to do some deeper study on the Cambridge Platonists at some stage, especially in the light of Peter Sterry's writings. Generally their dependence on Plato is seen in their conception of the will; but it wouldn't surprise me to see the eternal forms of Plato converted to the axioms of revelation.

The divines of course were not confronted with the quagmire of epistemological method which has become standard since Hume and Kant; but there is enough in their writings to indicate a position which I call biblical rationalism, and which upholds the integrity of right reason in matters of faith. It is beyond doubt that they would have sided with Clark in affirming the integrity of our knowledge of God, but they would have done so without entering into the semantics of the qualitative/quantitative distinction. They probably would have contented themselves with a statement like Dabney's: "These great truths, that God is really (though not completely) known to them that seek Him, are the practical foundation of all the holiness and all the homage of earth and heaven" (The Sensualistic Philosophy, 174). As Dabney goes on to explain, "the principles of our reason compel us to hold that truth is intrinsic and immutable. If a proposition is true, then it is true everywhere, and to all grades of minds... This, then, is the noble prerogative of the Reason, that its very nature, as an agent for the apprehension of Truth, establishes its kinship to all the realms of mind in heaven and earth. In the attainment of Truth, whose original dwelling-place must be in the eternal bosom of God, the reason sees its heirship and recognizes itself as the offspring of God."

 

[tewilder]

I agree there is a personal element to knowledge - but it does not follow that knowledge is anything more than propositional. Any non-propositional knowledge would be unknowable (at best) and utter nonsense (at worst).

Do you know what it is like to see something blue? If so, is that a proposition?

 

[NaphtaliPress]

They probably would have contented themselves with a statement like Dabney's: "These great truths, that God is really (though not completely) known to them that seek Him, are the practical foundation of all the holiness and all the homage of earth and heaven" (The Sensualistic Philosophy, 174).

A plug, a plug! Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy is available:
http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php?t=18755

 

[CDM]

Humes was someone who I found that used the terms ectypal and archetypal - so I was wondering if he was a source of the concept. It is relevant because Humes used the terms in a similar fashion and I am trying to understand how the concepts were developed. I haven't found the terminology elsewhere (not that my resources are exhaustive despite the Internet and Google ).

I guess what I'm saying is that a copy of a proposition is the same things as the proposition. When you think of the number 7 and I think of the number 7, we are are both thinking the exact same 7 - not two different 7's. Seven does not mean 6 to you and 8 to me. And so if God knows p and he reveals p to me such that I know p, then we both know the same thing, regardless if God knows it eternally and I know it temporally, p is p. (the law of identity.)

I'm not sure what the difference is between includes and implies; but supposing there is nothing inimical, would you be happy to say that knowledge implies experience? Then, on the basis that a good Clarkian would at least agree God's knowledge is quantitatively different from ours, would you agree that our implied experience of God must be quantitatively different from our knowledge of God, seeing the object of knowledge acts in a quantitatively greater manner than our knowledge can conceive Him?

I'm dying to hear a respopnse to this. Anthony?

Hi Rich. Clark's thought is constructed in terms of idealism, which the Westminster divines generally rejected. The Confession's position on the "marks" of Scripture and assurance of grace indicates their belief that knowledge was possible by means of information external to Scripture. There were some radicals at the Assembly who were Fifth Monarchy men and Cambridge Platonists. I hope to do some deeper study on the Cambridge Platonists at some stage, especially in the light of Peter Sterry's writings. Generally their dependence on Plato is seen in their conception of the will; but it wouldn't surprise me to see the eternal forms of Plato converted to the axioms of revelation.

The divines of course were not confronted with the quagmire of epistemological method which has become standard since Hume and Kant; but there is enough in their writings to indicate a position which I call biblical rationalism, and which upholds the integrity of right reason in matters of faith. It is beyond doubt that they would have sided with Clark in affirming the integrity of our knowledge of God, but they would have done so without entering into the semantics of the qualitative/quantitative distinction. They probably would have contented themselves with a statement like Dabney's: "These great truths, that God is really (though not completely) known to them that seek Him, are the practical foundation of all the holiness and all the homage of earth and heaven" (The Sensualistic Philosophy, 174). As Dabney goes on to explain, "the principles of our reason compel us to hold that truth is intrinsic and immutable. If a proposition is true, then it is true everywhere, and to all grades of minds... This, then, is the noble prerogative of the Reason, that its very nature, as an agent for the apprehension of Truth, establishes its kinship to all the realms of mind in heaven and earth. In the attainment of Truth, whose original dwelling-place must be in the eternal bosom of God, the reason sees its heirship and recognizes itself as the offspring of God."

Keep up the good work, Rev. Winzer and Anthony.

 

[Civbert]

I'm not sure what the difference is between includes and implies; but supposing there is nothing inimical, would you be happy to say that knowledge implies experience?

I can agree with "if one has faith a X, then one will trust X". But I don't know how to formulate "knowledge implies experience". "If one has knowledge, then one ... . I don't know what to put here.

I would say that all men have the knowledge of the existence of God, and this knowledge makes him inexcusable. I believe men are born with this knowledge - and that no "experience" (beyond being created" is responsible for man having this knowledge.

But if we consider the knowledge of the gospel, in most case there was an experience of hearing the Word preached and the experience of regeneration. But this too is unnecessary experience. An infant in his mothers womb can receive saving knowledge since ultimately, it is a work of God on him mind and heart. God does mostly work through ordinary means in letting us know things, by hearing his Word, reading the Scriptures, listening to a gospel message - but God can give one "immediate" knowledge of the gospel (if I am using the term correctly).

Then, on the basis that a good Clarkian would at least agree God's knowledge is quantitatively different from ours, would you agree that our implied experience of God must be quantitatively different from our knowledge of God, seeing the object of knowledge acts in a quantitatively greater manner than our knowledge can conceive Him?

As far as I understand you here. I don't know of anyone who claims we have the same quantity of knowledge as God.

I'm not sure what a "quantitatively greater manner" means. And I don't think I'm seeing the "knowledge implies experience".

I can add off hand that, as a "good Clarkian", I reject empiricism. I say that it is impossible to go from pure sensation and convert it into a proposition. And my understanding of empiricism is the theory of knowledge that says all knowledge is derived from the sensory experience. (Usually this assumes that at birth, the mind is a blank slate - a .)

And as a preemptive comment - reading is not empiricism - since it depends on a priori knowledge the connection between written symbols and the ideas they represent. You can't read a sentence if you don't know how to read in the first place. The same applies to hearing words.

I also reject rationalism with says knowledge is a product of reason alone.

So do you believe all knowledge is a product of experience (as in reading, hearing words, etc)?

 

[Civbert]

Anthony,

You moved the thread into a different direction so I formed a new thread around Clark's thought.

I think that was a good editorial decision. However, could you change the title of the thread to Knowledge and Archetypal/Ectypal Theology. I find "Clarkianism" objectionable as I'm sure Van Tilians would "Vantilianism". I'm interested in looking at what knowledge is (and propositional knowledge is heardly unique to Gordon Clark).

I think Rev Winzer was careful not to necessarily tie AT/ET with the the Van Tillian idea of "no common point of intellectual content between man and God" or that ET was analogical. I think those are potential views that might fit into the AT/ET framework, but they are not implied by the concept.

And if the AT/ET are really just depicting the relationship between God's ultimate knowledge of himself, and the knowledge he reveals to us - I don't consider it antithetical to my Clarkian view of knowledge. It might be a bit of a square peg in a round hole ... but it could still fit.

Interesting to note that you're helping to distinguish Clarkianism from this historically Reformed formulation.

Maybe. Not sure about that. After all, there is no universal "historical Reformed formulation". Clark's thought may differ with some reformers, but they are not unique to him or absent in the historical reformed faith.

Again, please drop the use of Clarkianism. I am a Clarkian, not a Clarkianist. I have no objection to being called either a Clarkian or a Scripturalist. I don't care for the term Clarkianism - it sounds pejorative to my ears.

Thanks.

 

[Civbert]

Do you know what it is like to see something blue? If so, is that a proposition?

Yes. Any answer I give would be a proposition and probable in the form of a simile since you asked me "what it is like". I could say "seeing something blue is like the taste of cream cheese after sipping strong coffee". The is a statement, either true or false. A proposition.

 

[VictorBravo]

A plug, a plug! Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy is available:
http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php?t=18755

And I'll add, buy it. It is amazing.

 

[MW]

And I'll add, buy it. It is amazing.

 

[MW]

So do you believe all knowledge is a product of experience (as in reading, hearing words, etc)?

So far as humans are concerned, that is what Rom. 1:20 teaches. As Calvin says "men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him... But upon his individual works he has engraved unmistakable marks of his glory, so clear and so prominent that even unlettered and stupid folk cannot plead the excuse of ignorance."

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I think that was a good editorial decision. However, could you change the title of the thread to Knowledge and Archetypal/Ectypal Theology. I find "Clarkianism" objectionable as I'm sure Van Tilians would "Vantilianism". I'm interested in looking at what knowledge is (and propositional knowledge is heardly unique to Gordon Clark).

Done.

Maybe. Not sure about that. After all, there is no universal "historical Reformed formulation". Clark's thought may differ with some reformers, but they are not unique to him or absent in the historical reformed faith.

I was careful to distinguish by saying "...this formulation..." referring to the TA/TE distinction.

 

[Civbert]

So far as humans are concerned, that is what Rom. 1:20 teaches. As Calvin says "men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him... But upon his individual works he has engraved unmistakable marks of his glory, so clear and so prominent that even unlettered and stupid folk cannot plead the excuse of ignorance."

It would take more than a single verse to convince me that all knowledge is a product of experience. And the verse, and it's context supports that all men have the knowledge of God instilled in them by God directly, not by mans' reasoning from experience.

Rom 1:20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse,

Since it speaks of his "invisible attributes", then seen is not "to sense with the eyes" but to understand with the mind. And what is understood, is understood "by" the things made not as a consequence of the created world. Especially in light of Rom 1:19 which tells us that God made "manifest" in them" by reveling it to them.

Rom 1:19 because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them.

And even Rom 1:18 tells us that the wrath of God is "revealed from heaven".

Rom 1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who suppress the truth in unrighteousness,

Now I don't know about most people, but when I meditate on mountains and stream, I don't sense or deduce or induce God's wrath. In fact, without presupposing God exists, I don't see any valid or sound argument that leads one from "see that butterfly" to understanding God's wrath.

So how I understand Rom 1:18-20 is God instills the knowledge of himself within all men, so that none have an excuse for turning away from Him. I don't see men meditating on nature and without exception, seeing God's invisible attributes: his wrath and his eternal power and Godhead. It just doesn't follow - and these verses convict all men.

It seems to me that Romans teaches us that experience has nothing to do with spiritual knowledge.

 

[MW]

Since it speaks of his "invisible attributes", then seen is not "to sense with the eyes" but to understand with the mind. And what is understood, is understood "by" the things made not as a consequence of the created world. Especially in light of Rom 1:19 which tells us that God made "manifest" in them" by reveling it to them.

Whether you understand "by" in terms of agency or instrumentality, the conclusion is the same -- knowledge requires experience.

No, I wouldn't pin the position solely on this verse. But this verse provides a clear account of the relationship of men to general revelation, as is acknowledged by all orthodox divines. I could also refer to the miracles, which excite amazement; parables, which express astonishment at men seeing but not perceiving; prophecies, which can be ascertained to be true by fulfilment; poetry, which related divine things by human feelings; the types of the OT, which foresignify truth in cultic institutions; sacraments, as signs and seals of inward grace; and so on and so forth.

The very idea of special revelation presupposes the importance of experience for knowledge. The WCF echoes Heb. 1:1 in its statement that God revealed himself in divers manners in times past; it then proceeds to state that Scripture was written in order to wholly preserve this revelation. Revelation predates inscripturation. Act-revelation comes first, followed by word-revelation. This is the basis upon which reformed biblical theology is established. To deny the importance of experience for knowledge is to demolish the idea of history as a medium for revelation, and consequently to undermine the historical facts of which Scripture speaks.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Whether you understand "by" in terms of agency or instrumentality, the conclusion is the same -- knowledge requires experience.

No, I wouldn't pin the position solely on this verse. But this verse provides a clear account of the relationship of men to general revelation, as is acknowledged by all orthodox divines. I could also refer to the miracles, which excite amazement; parables, which express astonishment at men seeing but not perceiving; prophecies, which can be ascertained to be true by fulfilment; poetry, which related divine things by human feelings; the types of the OT, which foresignify truth in cultic institutions; sacraments, as signs and seals of inward grace; and so on and so forth.

Very well put. I think the main problem I have with the idea that all knowledge is merely proposition is the idea that everything we know can be expressed in logical syllogisms.

Frankly, Anthony, saying "...blue is like cream cheese..." is completely inadequate. It wouldn't communicate what blue is to a blind man. Some things cannot be expressed in words.

The Christian religion is certainly about propositional truth - ideas that can be expressed in axioms and conclusions but it is far more than that. When Adam is said to know Eve there is much more communicated than some sort of cold, rational calculation where Adam expresses his knowledge of her in axiomatic language.

My largest problem with the way you express knowledge is that it is dissonant with the rich emotional expression that is unmistakable in the Psalmists and the Prophets. In trying to shoehorn them into an "...all knowledge is proposition..." you do great injury to the truth that we all know and have experienced. Your philosophical explanation of such things might be adequate for you but it does not jive at all with experience and cannot express the world of things that we truly know without a philsopher having to tell us that we really don't.

Now, no doubt Anthony, you will ask me to prove that I know something without expressing it. Where you tell me I can express a thing like a young married couple on their wedding night in a proposition, the Scriptures say that it is inexpressible. You seem to think that by the mere proposition of it you have knowledge of it.
[bible]Proverbs 30:18-19[/bible]