Charles Hodge And Van Til

[DouglasGregory418]

So I just got a copy of Hodges 3 volume systematic ($27 on WTS right now).
A few months ago I was reading Van Til on introduction to systematic theology and He was saying that Hodge did not assume the Christian Worldview (presupposition) before applying his ideas of systematics (which is still using deductive and inductive reasoning).
When I read Hodge, I simply did not see this as being so (though it is not as blatant)

I was wondering if anyone knew of a work that discusses and attempts to reconcile their views- or if anyone had any thoughts

 

[Jesus is my friend]

Hi Brother and welcome to the PB we need you here and look forward to continue to read your posts

I'm sorry I cant give you and answer to your question but I'm sure someone here can help you

Would you recommend Hodge's set for me all I have is Grudem's and Reymonds

 

[The Calvin Knight]

Van Til attacked Hodge on Hodge's lauded view of human reason. Hodge, and even Warfield, believed that one could stand on common ground with non-Christians and use neutral reason to show that God exists. Van Til, However, followed Abraham Kuyper and said that depending on where one starts, what one presupposes, one will come out with a different answer. Kuyper said that if you start with naturalism one will interpret everything in naturalistic terms (vice versa for Christianity). George Marsden, in The Soul of the American University, highlights the point that an over-reliance on neutral human reason and its dependence on teleological and cosmological arguments was a contributing factor to the fall of many Christian Universities like Yale, Princeton, Harvard, etc. (I'm currently taking a class with Dr. Marsden on the history of the American University and how we as Christians should "do" education). Dr. Marsden highlights this point best with a quote from Warfield saying,

It is the distinction of Christianity that it has come into the world clothed, with the mission to reason its way to its dominion. Other religions may appeal to the sword, or seek some other way to propagate themselves. Christianity makes its appeal to right reason, and stands out among all religions, therefore, as distinctly "Apologetic religion." It is solely by reasoning that it has come thus far on its way to its kingship. And is solely by reasoning that it will put all its enemies under his feet.

The Context for such apparent intellectual bravado was not an attack on theological liberalism but a reaction to suggestion of a fellow theological conservative, Abraham Kuyper of the Netherlands, that science might lead to different conclusions for Christians than it did for non-Christians...The intellectul basis for this rejection of homogenization of academic life was Kuyper's rejection of the Enlightenment premise that there must be one science for all humanity...Kuyper wrote...there are "two kinds of people," regenerate and unregenerate, and hence "two kinds of science".
The Soul of the American University pg 213-214

It was in this context that Van Til attacked Warfield and Hodge's view of reason, though he does seem to be overly critical of both (as with most of the people Van Til deals with).

 

[py3ak]

This post from Paul Helm's blog is an interesting approach that has some bearing on the subject.

Helm's Deep: Christian Theology: Words about words about words?

Brian, Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology (make sure you get the purple Eerdman's edition, as that includes his prolegomena) is a standard reference work that would serve you well: it is more mainstream Reformed than Grudem or Reymond. But for a work that makes systematics come alive, I would suggest John Brown's Systematic Theology.

 

[ChristianTrader]

This post from Paul Helm's blog is an interesting approach that has some bearing on the subject.

Helm's Deep: Christian Theology: Words about words about words?

Brian, Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology (make sure you get the purple Eerdman's edition, as that includes his prolegomena) is a standard reference work that would serve you well: it is more mainstream Reformed than Grudem or Reymond. But for a work that makes systematics come alive, I would suggest John Brown's Systematic Theology.

I think Helm is on to something there.

CT

 

[rbcbob]

This post from Paul Helm's blog is an interesting approach that has some bearing on the subject.

Helm's Deep: Christian Theology: Words about words about words?

Brian, Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology (make sure you get the purple Eerdman's edition, as that includes his prolegomena) is a standard reference work that would serve you well: it is more mainstream Reformed than Grudem or Reymond. But for a work that makes systematics come alive, I would suggest John Brown's Systematic Theology.

“All these outlooks are certainly different, but they have in common what I shall call ‘theological autonomy’, the idea that (for whatever reason) theology is a distinct discipline which does not depend upon any others. That is, supposedly, its strength. It has insulated itself from intellectual attack. But may theology not be the Emperor who has no clothes rather than the Queen of the sciences?” __Paul Helm

If Van Til's apologetic is "new" then how does it differ from Owen?

“We believe the Scripture to be the word of God with divine faith for its own sake only; or, our faith is resolved into the authority and truth of God only as revealing himself unto us therein and thereby.

“Unless we intend so to wander, we must come to something wherein we may rest for its own sake, and that not with a strong and firm opinion, but with divine faith. And nothing can rationally pretend unto this privilege but the truth of God manifesting itself in the Scripture;

“Most persons, therefore, are effectually converted to God, and have saving faith, whereby they believe the Scripture, and virtually all that is contained in it, before they have ever once considered them.”-John Owen

"But the doctrines contained in the Scripture, or the subject-matter of the truth to be believed, have not in them the nature of a testimony, but are the material, not formal, objects of faith, which must always differ. If it be said that these truths or doctrines do so evidence themselves to be from God, as that in and by them we have the witness and authority of God himself proposed unto us to resolve our faith into, I will not farther contend about it, but only say that the authority of God, and so his veracity, do manifest themselves primarily in the revelation itself, before they do so in the things revealed; which is that we plead for." -Owen Volume IV

I am not at all sure that Helm et al are steering us on a helpful course.

“If, as biblical theism contends, the ultimate reality is the self-revealing God, then the structures of human experience will hardly be the final source of information about transcendent being … The basic axiom of every system is undemonstrable, that is, cannot be deduced from some still higher or prior knowledge, since the whole system of theorems and propositions is dependently suspended upon this primary axiom. The axioms of the Christian system of truth are not presuppositions shared in common with secular thought. Christian doctrines are not derived from experimental observation or from rationalism, but from God in his revelation. For revealed religion, the primary axiomatic importance of divine revelation is ultimately a matter of life or death.” __Carl F.H. Henry God, Revelation, and Authority Vol I, pp. 197,223.

 

[Philip]

Hodge and Van Til are working from two different epistemologies, which is why Van Til doesn't like Hodge.

Hodge (and all of the Princeton theologians) are working off of a Scottish Common Sense Epistemology such as Thomas Reid espoused. What Reid (and his followers) did was to negate the enlightenment epistemologies of Descartes, Hume, and (later) Kant by simply subjecting them to common sense--which is assumed rather than proven. In essence, common sense epistemology rebuilds the pre-modern epistemology by asking the question "How do we know?" in a context other than a philosophical one. It assumes that any epistemology which would be absurd in a court of law is equally absurd in epistemology. In terms of theology, this means that the believer and the unbeliever can see the same things--they just happen to come to different conclusions based on different reasoning.

Van Til, on the other hand, is following in the Dutch Reformed tradition of Abraham Kuyper, which owes more to continental philosophy as embodied in Kant. It operates off of an assumption that all of our knowledge of the world is indirect, filtered through our senses/presuppositions. In Kuyper/Van Til, this is used to show that sin has so much clouded the judgment of the unbeliever that he never really perceives reality, so that there is no common ground.

Hope that helps explain the difference.

And I think that Helm is dead-on.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Hodge and Van Til are working from two different epistemologies, which is why Van Til doesn't like Hodge.

Hodge (and all of the Princeton theologians) are working off of a Scottish Common Sense Epistemology such as Thomas Reid espoused. What Reid (and his followers) did was to negate the enlightenment epistemologies of Descartes, Hume, and (later) Kant by simply subjecting them to common sense--which is assumed rather than proven. In essence, common sense epistemology rebuilds the pre-modern epistemology by asking the question "How do we know?" in a context other than a philosophical one. It assumes that any epistemology which would be absurd in a court of law is equally absurd in epistemology. In terms of theology, this means that the believer and the unbeliever can see the same things--they just happen to come to different conclusions based on different reasoning.

Van Til, on the other hand, is following in the Dutch Reformed tradition of Abraham Kuyper, which owes more to continental philosophy as embodied in Kant. It operates off of an assumption that all of our knowledge of the world is indirect, filtered through our senses/presuppositions. In Kuyper/Van Til, this is used to show that sin has so much clouded the judgment of the unbeliever that he never really perceives reality, so that there is no common ground.

Hope that helps explain the difference.

And I think that Helm is dead-on.

The problem with the common sense approach is that it assumes that we know certain things then asks, "Okay given that I know x, y, and z; what has to be true for me to know such." A more basic question is do I know x, y, and z, at all. Various forms of Eastern philosophy questions the basic assumptions of Common Sense Philosophy and the common sense philosophy has no answer, (except perhaps, "I am going to assume that you are wrong").

Another problem with Hodge et. al is that it seems that they believed that experience did not necessarily need interpretation. Warfield was more guilty of this than Hodge. Hodge was able to see evolution as atheism and reject it while Warfield was not as firm.

Now I do disagree with Van Til on some basic levels but just because he believes that things are filtered through presups, does not imply lack of a common ground. There is only no common ground if I cannot reason with someone and point out how they are abusing reason with their bad presupps etc.

CT

 

[Philip]

The problem with the common sense approach is that it assumes that we know certain things then asks, "Okay given that I know x, y, and z; what has to be true for me to know such." A more basic question is do I know x, y, and z, at all. Various forms of Eastern philosophy questions the basic assumptions of Common Sense Philosophy and the common sense philosophy has no answer, (except perhaps, "I am going to assume that you are wrong").

The common sense approach does have an answer to that: we have to assume these things in order to live at all, therefore we know them. Anything else is skepticism. Questioning your foundations for a belief is skepticism--it can be useful for certain things, but cannot be allowed to run amok (see also: Descartes, Hume, Kant, Clark).

All that said, I do think that common sense tells us that presuppositions do color the way we view the world, making me a common sense presuppositionalist (similar to Plantinga--though I disagree with him on some points).

 

[ChristianTrader]

The problem with the common sense approach is that it assumes that we know certain things then asks, "Okay given that I know x, y, and z; what has to be true for me to know such." A more basic question is do I know x, y, and z, at all. Various forms of Eastern philosophy questions the basic assumptions of Common Sense Philosophy and the common sense philosophy has no answer, (except perhaps, "I am going to assume that you are wrong").

The common sense approach does have an answer to that: we have to assume these things in order to live at all, therefore we know them. Anything else is skepticism. Questioning your foundations for a belief is skepticism--it can be useful for certain things, but cannot be allowed to run amok (see also: Descartes, Hume, Kant, Clark).

But would you not be asking the Eastern folks to do what you says leads to skepticism, (question their foundations)? Also there is a big difference between reasoning to determine what has to be the case or what has to be true and relying on common sense beliefs. If by reason you accept certain beliefs and reject others, I am not sure how you can call that common sense?

Questioning foundations is only a problem if one is forced into an infinite regress. If there is a bedrock that one can drill too then, "Drill, Baby, Drill".

All that said, I do think that common sense tells us that presuppositions do color the way we view the world, making me a common sense presuppositionalist (similar to Plantinga--though I disagree with him on some points).

I disagree with Plantinga on some points as well, and that is why I am not a common senes presuppositionalist.

CT

 

[MW]

Helm's blog post failed to account for the fact that the reformed tradition was forged within Christendom, and Christendom brought its own closed world view along presuppositional lines. Hodge was still working on the back end of that worldview. With the dissolution of Christendom it became necessary for apologetics to clearly articulate its presuppositional basis. Enter Van Til.

To the OP, there is no genuine discrepancy between Hodge and Van Til on this point.

 

[Turtle]

Man is not entitled to his presuppositions.

... attempts to reconcile their views- or if anyone had any thoughts

If we concede that each man is entitled to his own presuppositions then... shazam, even the atheist and the Christian immediately have "common ground"... and why wouldn't they? If the atheist is kind enough to grant you a presupposition (or better yet, if he can accuse you of taking it for yourself) then he can say you are indebted to grant him the same courtesy of entitlement.

Every man's conscience is able to consider whether or not he is entitled to his presuppositions, and the mysterious result is that some have a conscience that actually delights in the truth that he is not, and pants for more revelation. Yet, others naturally suppress even the observation of their grip upon entitlement. They prefer to carve out an alternate common ground where they have a measure of mutually acknowledged entitlement, untroubled by the pricking of their conscience as they forge dialectic "truths", hand in hand.

Now if someone were to take umbrage at an address to their conscience.. and called for the necessity of discussion from common ground.. Would it amount to an accusation of trespassing?

 

[Philip]

Questioning foundations is only a problem if one is forced into an infinite regress. If there is a bedrock that one can drill too then, "Drill, Baby, Drill".

All foundations can be questioned--which is why we must start with what we know and reason back until we reach irreducible complexity.

But would you not be asking the Eastern folks to do what you says leads to skepticism, (question their foundations)? Also there is a big difference between reasoning to determine what has to be the case or what has to be true and relying on common sense beliefs. If by reason you accept certain beliefs and reject others, I am not sure how you can call that common sense?

Part of what I mean is this: if you must assume it in order to get up in the morning, then you are justified in assuming it in philosophy. If it's ridiculous to the layman, then it's ridiculous in philosophy. That's just common sense.

In a word, all that Eastern (and western) skepticism is, is a reductio ad rism. The main thing that we should be skeptical of is doubt: "am I reasonable in doubting this belief?"

 

[MW]

A philosophy student asks the philosphy professor, Sir, how can I know if I exist? To which the philosophy professor responds, Whom shall I say is asking?

Some facts are foundational such that they do not admit of doubt or require proof in the technical sense of the term.

 

[Philip]

A philosophy student asks the philosphy professor, Sir, how can I know if I exist? To which the philosophy professor responds, Whom shall I say is asking?

Some facts are foundational such that they do not admit of doubt or require proof in the technical sense of the term.

And that is common sense. If denying a proposition leads to a reductio ad rism, it should be rejected just as if it were a reductio ad absurdum.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Questioning foundations is only a problem if one is forced into an infinite regress. If there is a bedrock that one can drill too then, "Drill, Baby, Drill".

All foundations can be questioned--which is why we must start with what we know and reason back until we reach irreducible complexity.

No they cannot, at least not rationally. So the question of what or how one knows is illegitimate?

But would you not be asking the Eastern folks to do what you says leads to skepticism, (question their foundations)? Also there is a big difference between reasoning to determine what has to be the case or what has to be true and relying on common sense beliefs. If by reason you accept certain beliefs and reject others, I am not sure how you can call that common sense?

Part of what I mean is this: if you must assume it in order to get up in the morning, then you are justified in assuming it in philosophy. If it's ridiculous to the layman, then it's ridiculous in philosophy. That's just common sense.

In a word, all that Eastern (and western) skepticism is, is a reductio ad rism. The main thing that we should be skeptical of is doubt: "am I reasonable in doubting this belief?"

Saying that you believe something because the opposite belief leads to various forms of contradiction is not relying on common sense.

Answering if "I am reasonable or not in doubting this belief" has split a tremendous amount of ink in the past and will continue to do so in the future.
An appeal to common sense is not going to help you avoid adding your own ink to the mix.

CT

-----Added 11/8/2009 at 09:58:43 EST-----

A philosophy student asks the philosphy professor, Sir, how can I know if I exist? To which the philosophy professor responds, Whom shall I say is asking?

Some facts are foundational such that they do not admit of doubt or require proof in the technical sense of the term.

And that is common sense. If denying a proposition leads to a reductio ad rism, it should be rejected just as if it were a reductio ad absurdum.

But how would you know it without investigation? Now I am not saying that one will necessarily come to a conclusion different from the majority of people on any particular issue. A large number of propositions do not necessarily indicate that they lead to nonsense without reasoning them out. If that is the case, one holds to the acceptance or rejection of the belief because one reasoned it out, not because it is held in common with a number of folks.

CT

 

[Philip]

No they cannot, at least not rationally. So the question of what or how one knows is illegitimate?

No--it's just that skepticism is not the answer. Skepticism follows logically from the modern definition of knowledge, therefore we ought to accept the pre-modern definition, as used by Plato, Aristotle, and Reid, and also assumed by Calvin, Luther, Hodge, etc.

Saying that you believe something because the opposite belief leads to various forms of contradiction is not relying on common sense.

I'm talking about reductio ad rism--the idea of denying our senses is, quite frankly, hilarious and clearly absurd in any other context, therefore we should assume it, whether or not there is a logical contradiction.

Answering if "I am reasonable or not in doubting this belief" has split a tremendous amount of ink in the past and will continue to do so in the future.

Reasonability is a rather fuzzy term, yes, but that alone doesn't mean that it is not a valid category.

I'll leave it at that for now, as we've gotten utterly off of the topic at hand.

 

[DouglasGregory418]

Hey friend

I have Reymond's, Bavinck's, Berkhof, Calvin's institutes, and now Hodge.

Reymond is actually my pastor when I visit in Florida (my parents) and I am quite pleased to be in the presence of so godly a man.

Bavinck's Dogmatic Theology is the best of all of them followed by Berkhof (which is more concise) they are both better than Reymond's (though his is excellent and builds on those ones- it's even more concise)
Hodge is a classic, and very comprehensive, but I think it's some what lesser than Bavinck (who is simply a superior theologian- though that's like comparing the world's strongest men to each other)

in short I would recommend Bavinck first, Hodge second ($27 bucks for all 3 vol on wtsbooks.com) if you are looking for multi volume- exhaustive systematics

If you are looking for concise- Berkhof is better in my opinion, but only because he's coming off of Bavinck- and not trying to summarize the other three (as Reymond is doing)

Reymond's is last on my list, but I would never give it up for anything (such is my personal respect for the man)

in short, my opinion is based off comprehensiveness more so than excellence.

-----Added 11/9/2009 at 12:03:11 EST-----

One more thing (friend)-
Reymond is a Clarkian presuppositionalist (though he has great respect for Van Til as he was taught by him)
If this bothers you Berkhof will be much more in line with your thoughts
If you are clarkian- then Reymond, I'm sure, will tickle you pink

-----Added 11/9/2009 at 12:29:13 EST-----

... attempts to reconcile their views- or if anyone had any thoughts

If we concede that each man is entitled to his own presuppositions then... shazam, even the atheist and the Christian immediately have "common ground"... and why wouldn't they? If the atheist is kind enough to grant you a presupposition (or better yet, if he can accuse you of taking it for yourself) then he can say you are indebted to grant him the same courtesy of entitlement.

Every man's conscience is able to consider whether or not he is entitled to his presuppositions, and the mysterious result is that some have a conscience that actually delights in the truth that he is not, and pants for more revelation. Yet, others naturally suppress even the observation of their grip upon entitlement. They prefer to carve out an alternate common ground where they have a measure of mutually acknowledged entitlement, untroubled by the pricking of their conscience as they forge dialectic "truths", hand in hand.

Now if someone were to take umbrage at an address to their conscience.. and called for the necessity of discussion from common ground.. Would it amount to an accusation of trespassing?

Of course you can question presuppositionalism- it is not a confessional idea- so you do have you freedom

I'm nor sure of how much you know about Van Til, but he would say that an atheists presuppositions are both illogical and inconsistent, whereas ours are both logically consistent and in sync with the observable evidence such that there is nothing about this world that cannot be explained by our world view.


ultimately the correct presuppositions are what allow us to correctly deduce our evidences

if the atheist comes to me (a microbiology student) and says 'why are you christian don't you know scientists believe in evolution and God is a farce of the ancients'
I say in return
'on what do basis do you make the interpretation that similar animals skeletons must have all come from a common ancestor- or even more so on what basis do you judge all the world that comes before your eyes.'

'I believe only in what I can taste, touch, see, smell, hear think about.'

'ah' I say, ' you are an empiricist! The senses, of course, only deliver facts. By what standard do you interpret those facts.'

(I usually do not receive an answer)

'Dedeuctive logic is the means of interpretation, and inductive logic if the cases exists within predetermined laws' says the atheist

I say in return 'you have two false assumptions there. Deductive logic only makes sense in light of all the facts being present (which you do not have),at the same time you cannot make account for the law of induction without a guarantee of the universality of laws. In addition you do not use deductive methods (or inductive methods) to determine that you should use deductive logic for the interpretation of facts. You empiricism uses non-empirical methods to attain itself, since the laws of logic are not material in nature. Your worldview is self defeating and any interpretation based on it will be false.'

-----Added 11/9/2009 at 12:35:03 EST-----

A philosophy student asks the philosphy professor, Sir, how can I know if I exist? To which the philosophy professor responds, Whom shall I say is asking?

Some facts are foundational such that they do not admit of doubt or require proof in the technical sense of the term.

And that is common sense. If denying a proposition leads to a reductio ad rism, it should be rejected just as if it were a reductio ad absurdum.

Just my thoughts of course, but I would say to both of these that when you question your self ad infinitum (do I exist, does God exist) you end up being forced to admit that you do, but you cannot prove it ultimately so you must take it on faith.
Who do you put that faith in (that anything you do has meaning or if you even exist)
even to the unbeliever there is no option but to admit a force greater than yourself (what ever it is) governs such matters and in order to form any basis you must accept as fact that laws govern the universe

this of course would not be accepted as logical Van-Tilian presuppositionalism, but it does point out that reducio ad absurdum nihilum is the only logical conclusion from atheism

all atheists therefore are deaists- at least